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I. INTRODUCrION
"Remember what happened in 1965." That statement can be heard
in any discussion regarding the importance of constructing a new base-
ball facility in my hometown of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Local business
and civic leaders understand the significance of 1965 to baseball fans in
Milwaukee. To his credit, Bud Selig, the owner of the Milwaukee Brew-
ers and Major League Baseball's current acting commissioner, has not
used the painful memory of 1965 to gain public support for his most
recent stadium proposal.' Nevertheless, many baseball fans in Milwau-
1. "After intimating relocation, Selig convinced the city, county, and state governments to
contribute $67 million (plus a $35 million loan) toward the construction of a new stadium that
he and other private investors will own. Selig plans to finance his share of the construction
costs by selling luxury boxes in advance." ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 139
(1992). See also Bruce Murphy, $pring Fever, MILWAUKEE MAGAZINE, Apr. 1993, at 82.
More recently, Selig revealed plans to build a stadium with a "convertible roof" at a cost of
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kee fear that what happened in 1965 will soon reoccur unless team reve-
nues are increased by the construction of a new stadium with luxury
boxes. Most Milwaukeeans remember that 1965 was the year that the
Milwaukee Braves left Milwaukee for Atlanta.' Furthermore, they also
understand that, if economic circumstances force the Brewers to aban-
don the city, Major League Baseball will, in all likelihood, vanish from
the city for good.
The Braves franchise, which had originally moved to Milwaukee
from Boston in 1953, initially prospered in its new locale.4 From 1953 to
1957, attendance averaged over two million fans a year, with a high of
2.22 million fans in 1957, when the team claimed its first World Series
crown.5 After 1957, however, the team's attendance began to decline as
its on-the-field performance soured.6 Thus, when the Braves' lease of
municipally-owned County Stadium expired after the 1965 season, a
"window of opportunity" existed for the team's new owners (led by Ray
Bartholome), who claimed that the team was losing money, to relocate.
Bartholome, lured by an attractive television deal, moved the franchise
to Atlanta.' The community would not lose the Braves without a fight;
however, local efforts (led by Senator William Proxmire) to enjoin the
team from leaving Milwaukee failed in 1966.9
approximately $190 million; public funding may be sought through a statewide sports lottery.
See, e.g., Jeff Browne, Stadium Lottery has Wide Appeal, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Mar. 21,
1994, at B6. One author estimates that the total government subsidy promised over the thirty-
year mortgage of such facility may exceed $350 million dollars. See Bruce Murphy, Trade
Secrets, MILWAUKEE MAGAZINE, Apr. 1994, at 21.
2. It has been estimated that luxury box rentals may add up to six million dollars to a
team's operating revenues each year. See Kathleen Morris, The Gimmicks, FINANCIAL
WORLD, July 7, 1992, at 48.
3. For a brief recounting of the circumstances preceding the Braves' departure for At-
lanta, see ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 128-29.
4. See Id. at 129.
5. Id.
6. From 1962 to 1965, the Braves finished no higher than in fifth place. Id.
7. Id.
8. After moving to Atlanta, the Braves' local television revenues tripled from 1965 to
1966. Id. at 225.
9. See Id.; The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that it would enforce baseball's exemp-
tion from antitrust statutes as articulated by the Supreme Court. State of Wisconsin v. Mil-
waukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966). See JAMES EDWARD MILLER, THE
BASEBALL BUSINESS: PURSUING PENNANTS AND PROFITS IN BALTIMORE 21-35 (1990) (detail-
ing the attempts of St. Louis Browns owner Bill Veeck to move the team from St. Louis.) See
infra Part III.
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I was only two years old when Major League Baseball returned to
Milwaukee in 1970 after a five-year hiatus.10 To this day, I am amazed
by the number of former Milwaukee Braves fans in Milwaukee who still
follow the franchise in Atlanta and prefer the style of play in the senior
circuit over that of the American League." Paradoxically, many of
these individuals are also the most loyal supporters of the Brewers, fre-
quenting games both in Milwaukee and at the team's spring training fa-
cility in Chandler, Arizona. As someone who grew up with the Brewer
franchise, I often wondered how these "old-timers" could remain loyal
to the Braves, especially when it was clear to me that the Braves had
greedily "abandoned" Milwaukee and its fans for what its owners per-
ceived as greener pastures elsewhere.'
Now, however, after listening to the debates raging over the new
baseball stadium proposal for Milwaukee, I have gained some insight
into the perspective of these "old-timers." Despite their divided loyal-
ties, they have an appreciation for the presence of Major League Base-
ball in Milwaukee that is generally lacking in most younger baseball fans
who have never experienced the hardship of losing a professional base-
ball franchise.' 3 While growing up, I remember the danger of discussing
the Braves with more senior baseball enthusiasts, knowing that it would
precipitate a lecture about the "good old days" and a reminder of how
lucky I was to have a Major League Baseball team in my hometown. I
also recall that, when attendance waned at Brewer games late in the sea-
10. For a brief recounting of the events leading to the return of Major League Baseball to
Milwaukee, see Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524,530-33 (E.D.Wis. 1983), aff'd 740 F.2d
572 (7th Cir. 1984).
11. One author, in fact, has concluded that "baseball fans are more loyal than in any other
sport - or have clouded minds. Maybe the inherent beauty of the game has blinded them to
reality." Dave Nightingale, Give Us Back the Game: Start With a New Commissioner and
Quick, and Then. . ., THE SPORTING NEws, Feb. 22, 1993, at 11.
12. For a telling description of the abandonment felt by baseball fans when a Major
League franchise relocates, see ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 125-29 (describing the circum-
stances surrounding relocations by the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles in 1957, the New
York Giants to San Francisco in 1957, and the Milwaukee Braves to Atlanta in 1965). It is
interesting to note that the Dodgers' move in 1957, like many proposed relocations today, was
precipitated by the owner's (Walter O'Malley) dissatisfaction with the Brooklyn Dodgers'
home field (Ebbetts Field). In response to the fans' claim that O'Malley was motivated by
greed, Buzzie Bavasi, O'Malley's right-hand man, noted that "If [O'Malley] ... saw the Cali-
fornia gold [and] went prospecting ... so be it. He was entitled." Id. at 128 (citing BUzziE
BAVASI, OFF THE RECORD 82 (1987)). Regarding the Braves' move, Bill Veeck observed that
it was "baseball's latest testimonial to the power of pure greed." Id. at 129 (citing BILL
VEECK, VEECK-As IN WRECK 301 (1962)). Finally, for an in-depth analysis of the move of
the St. Louis Browns franchise to Baltimore in 1954, see Miller, supra note 9, at 21-35.
13. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 125-29.
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son, these "old-timers" would quickly remind the community that a fail-
ure to support our local nine would force the team to move to a more
''appreciative" locale.
At the time, however, most baseball fans in Milwaukee viewed such
proclamations with a combination of disdain and bemusement. After all,
the circumstances involving the Braves' move to Atlanta were much dif-
ferent than those involving the Brewers franchise. The Brewers, unlike
the Braves, were committed to Milwaukee. The franchise was brought to
the city from Seattle in 1970 by a local group formed for the specific
purpose of bringing Major League Baseball back to Milwaukee. 14 The
Brewers' on-the-field performance would soon culminate in the
franchise's first division title in 1981 and a World Series appearance in
1982. Furthermore, attendance had been rising steadily as the team's
fortunes improved on the field.' 5 Given the success of the Brewers in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, it seemed clear that Major League Base-
ball had, in fact, succeeded in Milwaukee and that the Brewers would
remain a viable franchise in the foreseeable future.
So why do young baseball fans in Milwaukee now share the insecu-
rity long held by old Milwaukee Braves supporters, fearing that, if a new
baseball stadium is not built, the Brewers will abandon the commu-
nity? 16 Do these fears have a sound basis? If so, what, if anything, can
(or should) community leaders and/or Major League Baseball do to en-
sure the survival of professional baseball in Milwaukee and other "small
14. See Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524,531-33 (E.D.Wis. 1983), aff'd 740 F.2d 572
(7th Cir. 1984).
15. The average seasonal paid attendance for the Brewers from 1969-74 was 832,000.
That figure rose to 1,372,000 for the years of 1975-79,and further rose to 1,744,000 from 1980-
84. GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 104 (1989).
16. While no Major League team has relocated since 1972, at least seven teams
threatened to do so in 1990 and 1991; at least four of those teams may be properly classified as
"small-market clubs" (Milwaukee Brewers, Montreal Expos, Seattle Mariners, and Cleveland
Indians). See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 129. Nor is the Brewers franchise alone in request-
ing government assistance to build a new facility. In the past six years, citizens of San Fran-
cisco, San Jose, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Denver, Baltimore, Milwaukee, and Dallas-Fort
Worth, "have been asked to go to the polls to approve issuance of a municipal bond and/or
new taxes for the construction of new baseball stadiums. In each case there was the threat
that if the bond and/or taxes were rejected, the city's baseball team would flee to greener
pastures." Id. at xvi. Should a community fail to cave into an owner's demands, "'there are
club-hungry cities out there that realize the value of a major league franchise and are prepared
to make deals- often at the taxpayers' expense.'" Alexandria Biesada, Gimme A Break,
FINANCIAL WORLD, July 9, 1991, at 40 (1991). The citizens of Tampa-St. Petersburg, for ex-
ample, voted to finance the construction of a new ballpark in an attempt to attract an expan-
sion or existing team; so far, their effort has not borne fruit. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at
xvi.
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markets"? 17 These are some of the questions I will address in the re-
mainder of this Article. In Part II, I analyze several arguments regarding
the importance of small-market teams to the future success of Major
League Baseball. I conclude that it is in the best interests of Major
League Baseball to ensure that small market teams remain viable in or-
der to discourage the formation of rival leagues, to preserve for the
League the benefits of expansion opportunities, and to maintain the
popularity of Major League Baseball throughout the country. In Part
III, I analyze the viability of small-market teams given the current com-
petitive structure of Major League Baseball and expected future trends.
My conclusion is that the current governing structure of Major League
Baseball inadequately addresses the needs of small-market franchises
and seriously jeopardizes their future survival. In Part IV, I suggest the
need for either increased revenue sharing or a salary cap as vehicles to
ensure the survival of small-market clubs, with a preference for the for-
mer. I will also analyze relevant antitrust, labor, and contract issues. Fi-
nally, in Part V, I revisit the current status of the Milwaukee Brewers
stadium proposal and offer some concluding thoughts.
II. DOES MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL NEED SMALL-MARKET TEAMS?
Why should it be important to Major League Baseball that franchises
in Milwaukee and other small markets remain viable? After all, should
not owners of individual franchises be free to relocate their teams at will
whenever they believe that they can receive greater financial remunera-
tion elsewhere? 8 Would not such a "free and open market" for profes-
sional baseball franchises ensure that teams are located where
consumers will derive the most benefit (as measured by their ability to
pay)? Clearly, it would be an inefficient allocation of resources to re-
quire baseball franchises to remain in existing locations when, due to
changes in economic circumstances, other locales offer more profitable
opportunities. Before addressing these issues, it is important to articu-
late how the interests of franchise owners may conflict with the interests
17. For the purposes of this Article, I define "small-markets" to include cities with munic-
ipal populations of two million people or less. Under this definition, there are currently eight
Major League Baseball franchises residing in small markets; the Cleveland Indians, Kansas
City Royals, Milwaukee Brewers, Oakland Athletics, and Seattle Mariners of the American
League, and the Cincinnati Reds, Colorado Rockies, and San Francisco Giants of the National
League. The average population in these cities is approximately 1.6 million people, while the
average population of the other twenty major league cities is approximately 3.3 million peo-
ple. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 144.
18. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 12 (citing BAvAsI).
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of other owners under the current governing structure of Major League
Baseball and with society at large.
A. Separating conflicts between the interests of baseball owners and
the interests of society from conflicts among the interests of
individual baseball owners:
Clearly, the interests of franchise owners, as embodied by the Major
League Agreement ("the Agreement"), 9 and the interests of society in
encouraging market competition may conflict in the franchising of pro-
fessional baseball teams. In general, society disfavors the concentration
of economic power when it allows a small number of economic actors to
control the forces of supply or demand in a given industry or geographic
location. This sentiment, of course, is enforced through the nation's anti-
trust policy as embodied by the Sherman Act.2 0 Antitrust principles dic-
tate that, absent proof that a market restraint is reasonable,2' any Major
League Baseball policy that inhibits the "natural play" of market forces
should be discouraged.22 Presumably, this would include any restraints
on the relocation of franchises imposed by the Agreement.' Major
League Baseball owners, on the other hand, may desire some restrictions
on franchise movement that ostensibly conflict with the policies of the
Sherman Act.24 Because owners may disagree as to the wisdom of a
proposed move given its effects on the profitability of the relocating
franchise and the League itself, they may find it in their best interests to
19. The Major League Agreement acts as Major League Baseball's "constitution"; it is
adhered to by all of the franchises in the major leagues. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R.
ROBERTS, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS ON SPORTS AND THE LAW 2 (2d ed. 1993).
20. For a more complete discussion of antitrust policy as embodied by the Sherman Act
and its implications for the policies of Major League Baseball, see infra Part III. For purposes
of the discussion in Part II, however, it is sufficient to note that Section 1 of the Sherman Act
proscribes "every contract, combination,. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations .. .," while Section 2 of the Sherman Act
prohibits any person from "monopoliz[ing], or attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or
conspir[ing] with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations.. ." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp.
1993).
21. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911).
22. See infra Part III, which discusses the exemption from antitrust that Major League
Baseball, but no other professional sports league enjoys. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 270 (1972). For the purposes of Part II, however, it is sufficient to note the policies
underlying antitrust legislation and defer consideration of the antitrust exemption itself.
23. Currently, three-fourths of the owners in the same league as a relocating team must
approve the move; the Commissioner may block such a move under his or her "best interests"
power. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 125, 131.
24. Id.; See supra note 20.
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agree ex-ante on certain restraints over each individual owner's power to
unilaterally dictate where his or her team will be situated.
Apart from society's general interest in enforcing antitrust policy, the
Agreement must also accommodate conflicting interests among individ-
ual owners. While franchise owners may covet the power to establish
league policies that supersede the mandate of general antitrust princi-
ples,' they may nevertheless wish to maintain a significant level of free-
market activity in the relocation of franchises within the Agreement it-
self. Because owners generally have an interest in maintaining the free-
dom to move their teams in response to changing economic incentives,
we would expect them to create a system that would generally favor un-
fettered franchise relocations. Again, however, it is in each owner's in-
terest to retain some degree of control over franchise movements by his
or her brethren which adversely affect the financial position of his or her
team or the League as a whole.26 Presumably, the Agreement should
accommodate these conflicting interests in a manner that best promotes
the collective welfare of the franchise owners.
For several reasons, the above-referenced distinctions are significant
when analyzing the importance of small-market teams to Major League
Baseball. First of all, they have a direct effect on the decision over the
types of measures (if any) that should be adopted to ensure the survival
of small-market teams. Secondly, they help to answer the question of
whether owners can be trusted to adopt the best measures, or if society,
through antitrust policy and other laws, should also play a role. If soci-
ety has a strong interest in promoting competition for Major League
teams among cities, then antitrust policy should supersede self-regula-
25. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 131.
26. Such a system may take one of two forms. The owners could grant teams the absolute
power to relocate unless doing so would violate important League policies as expressly articu-
lated in the Agreement (for example, a requirement that teams cannot move to a new locale
within one hundred miles of an existing team). Or, the owners could create a system that,
while potentially subjecting all franchise relocations to significant restraints, would neverthe-
less encourage the non-enforceability of such restraints under most circumstances (for exam-
ple, a rule that all relocations are permitted without restrictions unless a specified number of
teams object). The current Agreement, by requiring Commissioner and super-majority owner
approval for franchise relocations, appears to fall under the latter regime. It is important to
recognize that, under such a system, current owners have an incentive to approve most pro-
posed moves in order to "create goodwill" in the event that they desire to relocate their teams
in the future. For example, between 1952 and 1972, only two owner-proposed moves were
rejected; in both cases, however, the persons involved were considered "outcasts among own-
ers" and the moves were later approved when new parties assumed ownership. See Zimbalist,
supra note 1, at 125. Similarly, in 1992, the sale of the San Francisco Giants to a group that
intended to move the team to Tampa/St. Petersburg was disapproved by vote of the owners,
who wished for the franchise to remain in San Francisco.
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tion by owners, 7 and owners must justify as "reasonable" any restraints
under the Agreement which were adopted to protect small-market
franchises. 28 If, on the other hand, society has only a marginal interest in
the policies of professional baseball, then the Agreement should super-
sede antitrust policy and the justifications for restraints adopted to pro-
tect small-market franchises need only be shown to be in the "best
interests of baseball. '29 As discussed in Part III, Major League Baseball
currently enjoys a special exemption from antitrust laws which gives
owners more administrative discretion than owners in other professional
leagues; however, we shall see that the exemption is by no means "iron-
clad."3 In light of this, and because the best interests of the Major
League Baseball owners may obviously conflict with those of society,
one should consider whether purported justifications for adopting mar-
ket restraints to preserve the integrity of small-market teams satisfies
antitrust review under either regime.31
B. The survival of small-market teams under the free-market model of
franchise relocation:
So what are some of the justifications that may be given to baseball
owners or antitrust courts for adopting measures to ensure the viability
of small-market teams? Before discussing purported justifications for
market restraints to protect small-market teams, we should first imagine
the state of affairs that would exist if there truly were open competition
among cities for Major League Baseball franchises. 32 If other communi-
ties could freely bid with current Major League cities for franchises, the
"proper" incentives would presumably be in place for owners and com-
munity leaders to determine whether moving a team would truly be eco-
nomically efficient. The Brewers franchise, for example, would be
encouraged to relocate under the free market model if Bud Selig could,
27. See supra note 20.
28. See supra note 21.
29. See supra note 23. Absent antitrust concerns, Major League Baseball owners would
presumably be willing to adopt rules to protect small-market franchises if such restrictions
contributed to the financial well-being of the majority of individual teams and, by implication,
the League itself. As shown in Part III, however, the mere threat of intrusion of antitrust
policy may be sufficient to compel compliance with such laws even though such action may not
be in the owners' collective (or, for that matter, individual) financial interest.
30. Id.; See infra Part III.
31. See supra note 23.
32. See supra note 23 for a discussion of the current rules for Major League Baseball
franchise relocation. Because franchise relocations require a three-quarters majority vote
among owners and Commissioner approval, the Agreement clearly does not ensure a free
market for teams.
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in fact, find a more profitable location in which to operate. Under this
model, the city of Milwaukee (as well as the state and other local munici-
palities) should subsidize the construction of a new stadium if the esti-
mated six million dollars a year in increased revenue from luxury boxes
and gate receipts adequately compares to the financial gain offered by a
bidding locale and the cost of building the stadium is outweighed by the
perceived benefits to the community.33 If, on the other hand, the in-
creased revenues from luxury box rentals and gate receipts are insuffi-
cient to keep the Brewers in Milwaukee, or the costs of building a new
stadium outweigh the perceived benefits to the community, then the city
should not subsidize its construction. In the latter scenario, the "invisi-
ble hand" of competition would channel the franchise to another city
where it would be more highly valued by consumers as measured by
their ability to pay.34 While unfortunate for the baseball fans of Milwau-
kee, those in another city would be rewarded for presumably deriving
more benefit from the "product" of Major League Baseball.
One should, however, also consider the creation of expansion
franchises under the "free market model. '35 First of all, it is important
to note that the free market model does not presuppose an optimal
number of Major League Baseball teams. That is, a decision by an
owner to move his or her team from a city does not prove that the city is
unable to support a Major League franchise. Thus, a determination by
Bud Selig that the Brewers franchise will be more profitable in another
locale does not necessarily mean that the team is losing money in Mil-
waukee. The free market model only predicts that, absent the possibility
of expansion and prohibitive transaction costs, Major League Baseball
franchises will, over time, be located in the communities where owners
expect to receive the greatest profits.36 Major League Baseball is, in
fact, a profitable venture in Milwaukee and other small markets, the re-
moval of restrictions on expansion would result in the creation of new
33. See Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 135-140.
34. See generally ADAM SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Glasgow ed. 1801) (discussing the invisible hand theory of
competition).
35. See ZIMBALISr, supra note 1, at 140-46.
36. In addition, Major League Baseball owners have an incentive to restrict the creation
of expansion teams; for as long as the "demand for teams from viable cities [is] greater than
supply, then existing teams have greater leverage in bargaining for new stadium construction,
new luxury boxes, lower rent, or a greater share of concession and parking revenues. They
can threaten to leave." Id. at 124.
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franchises to meet such demand.37 Presumably, then, the optimal
number of Major League Baseball franchises would be achieved under a
free-market model if expansion were unrestricted. As a result, justifica-
tions for preserving existing small-market franchises must also address
the arguments typically given for restrictions on League expansion.
C. Altering the free-market model: justifications for owners to adopt
measures to ensure the survival of small market teams:
Why, then, is the free-market model of franchise relocation, coupled
with unrestricted expansion, an insufficient response to the viability issue
involving small-market teams? What are some of the arguments ad-
vanced for adopting measures to ensure that existing small-market teams
are financially viable in the future? How do these justifications relate to
the distinctions made in section A of Part II? The remainder of Part II
discusses three common justifications for adopting measures to ensure
the survival of small-market teams, as well as their compliance with anti-
trust policies and the interests of Major League Baseball owners.
1. The interest of baseball fans in keeping their local franchise:
One justification often given for protecting small-market clubs is that
baseball fans in a team's current community have a significant interest in
keeping their local franchise which should be factored into Major
League Baseball's franchise relocation policy.3" While not advocating
that an owner be forced to continue operating in a non-profitable loca-
tion, proponents of this view argue that an owner should not be permit-
ted to move an existing franchise from one profitable location to
another. They claim that, if an owner wishes to own a team in a different
city, then he or she should sell his or her current team to someone will-
ing to operate in its current city and then purchase or seek an expansion
franchise in the desired locale. In discussing the relocation of the Dodg-
ers franchise from Brooklyn to Los Angeles, one author argued this po-
sition as follows:
Why should an individual like Walter O'Malley, who happened to
be in the right place at the right time, be able to rob Brooklyn, as
37. "Expansion to thirty-five or forty teams by the end of the century would mean that
more cities would have their demand for a team satisfied, a more equitable relationship would
develop between existing teams and host cities, and there would be a greater number of MLB
players. This outcome sounds like something economists call a welfare maximizing solution.
But economists never claimed that welfare maximization was a property of unregulated mo-
nopolies. A public policy is called for .... Id. at 146.
38. See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 411-12.
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Bill Veeck put it, of a part of its heritage? There is a perfectly
clear legal answer to this question. O'Malley had a property right
in the team that enabled him to do this without legal reproach.
But should not the borough of Brooklyn or New York City at
least share in this right? After all, the city nurtured the team dur-
ing its development, conferred upon the franchise part of its
trademark, gave the team what amounted to daily, abundant, free
advertising through sports coverage in its newspapers and media,
and provided a variety of subsidies to the club over the years.3 9
This was likely Howard Cosell's view when, while testifying before the
U.S. House of Representatives in 1981 regarding the lifting of Major
League Baseball's antitrust exemption, he referred to Major League
Baseball's policy regarding the movement of sports franchises as "the
rape of the cities."40
Obviously, this justification directly conflicts with the free-market
model previously discussed. If Major League Baseball enforced a non-
relocation and non-expansion policy, then franchises would presumably
be forced to remain in non-wealth maximizing locations.4 That is, com-
munities that value the presence of a Major League franchise more
highly than existing Major League cities, based on their willingness to
pay, would be denied the opportunity to attract an existing team or a
new franchise. 42 Such a regime would also violate our common under-
standing of property rights and the notion that, to maximize efficient use,
an owner must have freedom to do with his or her property as he or she
desires. Under the free-market model, the rights commonly associated
with the ownership of property must be enforced in order for resources
to be properly allocated. Presumably, society is made better off when
producers are able to respond quickly and accurately to changes in con-
sumer preferences, and producers are best able to react to changes in
market incentives through unfettered ownership of the forces of supply.
It was this notion that likely prompted Ted Turner's response to Howard
Cosell's above-referenced criticism when, while testifying at the same
hearings, he noted that "it is a pretty rampant case of socialism to say
that [baseball owners] cannot move." 43
39. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 128.
40. Id. at 123.
41. Id.; see ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 146.
42. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 123.
43. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 123. Not surprisingly, however, Cosell got the last word.
In response to Mr. Turner, Cosell stated emphatically: "I find that argument really could not
appeal to anybody over the age of six... they [baseball owners] talk out of both sides of their
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This justification also loses force when we consider the possibility of
a Major League Baseball policy encouraging expansion. 44 In such an
environment, a community losing an existing franchise could seek a re-
placement through expansion; and assuming that Major League Baseball
is viewed as profitable in that community, we would expect investors to
bid for new teams.4 5 Under this regime, it is likely that owners of ex-
isting franchises would, in fact, be unable to find more profitable com-
munities in which to move their teams. With free expansion, astute
investors would seek out "up and coming" communities in which to es-
tablish expansion franchises well before those areas developed to a point
where they would be able to attract an existing team; this is especially
true if the transactions costs in relocating an existing franchise are high.
Unrestricted expansion, then, may be viewed as a reasonable accommo-
dation between the interests of owners wishing to relocate their
franchises and baseball fans desiring to keep Major League Baseball in
profitable communities. This accommodation, of course, rejects the no-
tion that baseball fans in a particular community have "a special moral
entitlement" under every circumstance to keep an existing team, as op-
posed to securing an expansion team.46 As antitrust policy considers the
aggregate interest of all consumers, including those of a new locale, the
"moral entitlement" approach is not likely to win favor as a reasonable
market restraint.4 7 This is important given continued erosion of Major
League Baseball's antitrust exemption.48
Apart from antitrust concerns, however, owners are not likely to find
the "fan entitlement" justifications for adopting measures to protect
small-market franchises persuasive. After all, no owner amassed his or
her fortune by operating Major League Baseball franchises; they all ac-
cumulated wealth through other business ventures or inheritance. They
are the "successes" of our capitalistic society; they have all mastered the
nuances of the market and have learned how to react to market-created
incentives in order to most efficiently allocate their resources to meet
consumer demand. Given their success in these other markets, why
mouths. They have developed an everspinning spiral of hypocrisy and deceit that ascends up
to the heavens." ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 129.
44. One antitrust issue involving expansion is whether a potential investor or city should
have the right to insist that Major League Baseball offer a new franchise. See WEILER &
ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 392-93. A federal court rejected such a claim in professional
football. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1983).
45. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 392-393.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 20-21.
48. See infra Part III.
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should they be expected to'adopt restrictions on their ability to react to
consumer demand for Major League Baseball? Presumably, such re-
straints would lead to non-wealth maximizing behavior to the detriment
of society. Furthermore, the skills most owners have developed in the
market would be less useful in an environment characterized by restric-
tions on the use of productive resources. Finally, such restraints may
also act as a disincentive for individuals wishing to enter the market in
order to purchase Major League Baseball franchises. Potential owners
would presumably be less inclined to purchase teams from existing own-
ers if they were required to keep the team in its existing locale. Such a
rule would increase the risks facing potential owners. As a result, some
would exit the market and those remaining in the market would restrict
the amount they would be willing to pay to purchase an existing or ex-
pansion franchise. Clearly, Major League Baseball owners would be re-
luctant to adopt such measures if they would decrease the value and
liquidity of their holdings.
2. Preserving the benefits of expansion for the League:
A second justification for adopting measures to ensure the survival of
small-market teams is to preserve for current owners the benefits of ex-
panding into the most profitable markets. Major League Baseball can
accommodate new geographic markets by either the relocation of an ex-
isting franchise from a different location or the creation of a new expan-
sion team. When an existing team moves, the primary benefit of the
relocation goes to that team's owner, who directly benefits from the in-
crease in revenues of his or her team. Other owners may experience
some residual effects in profits through changes in travel costs, gate re-
ceipts, and national television contracts. If the League feels that the
abandoned locale is nevertheless profitable, it may approve an expan-
sion team for that community and profit from the fee paid by the new
owners, however, the expansion fee is likely to be less than the League
could have charged for the right to secure a new team in the more desir-
able location.49 On the other hand, if the League instead approved ex-
49. The factors underlying the calculation of expansion fees are often unclear. In theory,
an expansion fee should be the present value of the annual profit loss (if any) to each of the
existing clubs (primarily comprised of lost revenues from the national television contract and
league profit sharing arrangements) plus the initial costs of organization and administration
(for example, compensation to clubs for lost players). But while one source estimated such
losses in Major League Baseball at between $8 to $9 million per year, the most recent Na-
tional League expansion franchises (Colorado Rockies and Florida Marlins) paid $95 million
each to join the League, which appears well above the present value of the former income
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pansion into the desired location, the benefits from that location would
be captured by the current owners. In theory, the League could charge a
higher expansion fee than it could if it instead permitted an existing
owner to move his or her team to the desired location and then ap-
proved expansion in that less profitable site.50
While again violative of the spirit of the above referenced free-mar-
ket model, this justification may nevertheless carry some weight in a
"reasonableness" analysis under antitrust law.51 Baseball owners may
claim, for example, that the addition of new cities has a tremendous im-
pact on the viability and financial health of Major League Baseball (and,
secondarily, on each individual owner), a "public good" to which they
have been entrusted. Therefore, any decision to alter the mix of teams
should be made by the League itself and not by an individual owner
whose judgment may be "justifiably clouded" by his or her own short-
term financial interests or a court lacking expertise in this field. While
this argument may explain why the League, and not individual owner,
should decide whether or not to maintain the status quo, it does not ex-
plain why entry into a new market should be made through expansion
rather than by encouraging an individual owner to relocate his or her
existing franchise. The owners' response to this criticism may be that, as
part of its analysis of the impact of new teams on the viability and finan-
cial health of Major League Baseball, the League should be allowed to
consider the "reasonable expectations" of the general public. This is a
"soft" version of the previously described "fan entitlement justification"
for preserving small-market teams. While not claiming that the expecta-
tions of fans are determinative, owners would argue that, in circum-
stances where it is "reasonably clear" that a community will receive a
Major League franchise in the near future, consideration should be given
to the loyalty of baseball fans of existing Major League franchises. Such
stream. See Scully, supra note 15, at 147. Any payments above the theoretical amount would
represent monopoly rents. Also note that expansion fees are often a poor measure of the
actual value of the franchise created; if the theoretical value of a franchise is the value of its
assets plus the present value of its expected profits, any expansion fee above that amount
would also be evidence of monopoly profits in expansion fees. The $50 million expansion fee
charged by the National Hockey League for the right to operate teams in Ottawa and San
Jose, for example, was more than the estimated value of over half of the established National
Hockey League franchises. See Michael K. Ozanian & Stephen Taub, Financial World's Valu-
ation Scoreboard, FINANCIAL WORLD, July 7, 1992, at 50-51. The ability to extract monopoly
profits in expansion fees may allow the owners to collect the same amount irrespective of the
"degree of attractiveness" of the location of the expansion team.
50. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 147; OZANIAN & TAUB, supra note 49, at 50-51.
51. See supra notes 20-21. Again, remember that this analysis does not take into consid-
eration baseball's current exemption from antitrust laws. See infra Part Ill.
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a preference, the owners may argue, would best enhance the image of
Major League Baseball, minimize disappointment among existing fans,
and promote fan development for the new franchise. As a result,
League policy would reflect a preference for existing franchises to re-
main in their current communities, with expansion into new markets re-
served for the League itself.5 2 This outcome would, therefore, enhance
the financial returns to current owners while appeasing those demanding
removal of baseball's antitrust exemption. 3
3. Discouraging the formation of rival baseball leagues:
A third justification for adopting measures to ensure the future via-
bility of small-market teams is the owners' interest in discouraging the
formation of rival leagues. The likelihood that this would occur, of
course, depends significantly on the policy adopted by Major League
Baseball regarding expansion. If the League adopted a restrictive ex-
pansion policy, then the relocation of an existing franchise may create an
opportunity for the creation or expansion of a rival league. A rival
league, for example, may gain a foothold in Milwaukee if the Brewers
franchise is permitted to move to another community and Major League
Baseball is dilatory in "filling the void." With a more permissive policy
on expansion, Major League Baseball would be able to enter such mar-
kets in order to discourage the formation of a rival league. As stated by
one source:
Expansion into desirable cities targeted by a new league is a fa-
vorite tactic of established leagues, not only in hockey and in
football, but also in baseball. Indeed, Major League Baseball,
threatened in the late 1950's by Branch Rickey's proposed Conti-
nental Baseball League, hastily undertook its first expansion in
this century, into New York and Houston in the National League
and Washington and Kansas City in the American League.5 4
It therefore may be in the best interests of Major League Baseball own-
ers to have both a permissive expansion policy and to ensure the survival
of existing (and proposed) small-market franchises in order to protect
their "monopoly" position.
52. See supra note 49.
53. See infra Part II.
54. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 472. Weiler and Roberts also note that, despite
the effectiveness of such "preemptive measures" in destroying rival leagues, judges are reluc-
tant to prescribe them as "such a rule would forever deny fans in 'virgin' cities the opportunity
to secure a team in the established major league." Id. (discussing whether a rival team could
demand access to the stadium owned or leased by an established team). See also ZIMBALIST,
supra note 1, at 128.
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Note that, under this view, it may, in fact, be in the best interests of
Major League Baseball owners to adopt measures facilitating the exist-
ence of otherwise unprofitable franchises. We would fully expect the
Major Leagues to expand into profitable communities in order to dis-
courage the formation of rival leagues. However, the same logic dictates
that it also maintain franchises in "non-profitable" communities, for the
profitability of operating a team in a given location will be perceived
very differently by an established league and a new league. For example,
given the minimal amount of revenue sharing that currently exists in Ma-
jor League Baseball pursuant to the Agreement,55 small-market clubs
with much lower revenues must compete with teams in more prosperous
areas for talent and resources. Not surprisingly, many observers ques-
tion whether such clubs can, in fact, field competitive teams over time
without incurring tremendous losses. If Major League Baseball had sig-
nificant revenue sharing (for example, as is the case in the National
Football League), new franchises in small-markets would lower the reve-
nues of existing clubs if, as is likely, the income they "bring to the com-
mon pool" is less than the League average.
A start-up league, on the other hand, would view the profitability of
operations in such a community very differently. Since the primary con-
cern of a new league is establishing a foothold in significant metropolitan
areas across the United States, its owners would likely agree to subsidize
sites which were initially unprofitable. In addition, even if such a league
institutionalized revenue sharing among teams, it would not share the
existing league's reservations about accepting a city whose team would
earn revenues below the league average as many of its franchises would
develop in small markets neglected by the existing league. As a result,
and especially in light of the precarious position of its antitrust exemp-
tion,56 it appears that Major League Baseball owners would be wise to
consider steps to ensure the viability of teams in small markets.
Questions remain as to the optimal number of Major League Base-
ball franchises and the best way to protect small-market clubs. Part IV
of this Article addresses the latter issue. The question of "how many
teams is enough," however, is more difficult to assess. In theory, Major
League Baseball owners should encourage the operation of as many
teams as necessary to satisfy consumer demand, thereby discouraging
the entry of competitors into the market. Presumably, this would in-
clude the presence of franchises in small markets that, absent contribu-
55. See infra Part III.
56. Id.
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tions from more prosperous teams, would not be profitable in the long
run. But how many such teams would Major League Baseball need to
subsidize in order to satisfy the desires of baseball fans? If the Brewers
left Milwaukee, for example, would baseball fans in Wisconsin be con-
tent to follow clubs in Chicago and Minneapolis?57 Or would Milwau-
kee then become a viable target for entry by a rival league? One
method to determine the number of new markets that Major League
Baseball would need to accommodate would be to review the number of
cities vying for teams in Major League Baseball's latest round of expan-
sion in the National League. According to one source, at least fifteen
cities were originally interested in landing an expansion team; ultimately,
Denver and Miami were chosen.5" Out of the remaining thirteen re-
gions, eight are generally considered to be financially credible. These
regions would include: Buffalo, Indianapolis, Nashville, New Orleans,
Phoenix, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Washington D.C., and Vancouver.5 9 Of
these cities, five have populations less than that of the smallest current
Major League city (Buffalo, Indianapolis, Nashville, New Orleans, and
Vancouver); two are similar in size to existing small-market teams
(Phoenix and Tampa-St. Petersburg); and one, Washington D.C., has al-
ready lost two franchises (in 1960 to Minnesota and in 1971 to Texas)
and is close in proximity to Baltimore, the home city of the Orioles
franchise. 60
Clearly, Major League Baseball would not need to expand into each
of the above-listed markets in order to deter the formation of a rival
league. However, when faced with uncertainty over the number of com-
munities they can "neglect" before aggrieved investors launch a rival
57. Speaking from experience, I know that Brewers fans in Milwaukee would never adopt
their American League rivals, the Chicago White Sox, as their team of choice. It is also inter-
esting to note that baseball fans in western Wisconsin, who are geographically closer to Min-
neapolis than Milwaukee, generally support the Brewers franchise over the Tvins. In fact, a
significant number of these fans travel to Minneapolis to root for the Brewers against the
home team.
58. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 124.
59. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 145-46.
60. Id. Scully noted that the winning percentage of expansion clubs averages about .440
for the first decade of their existence. According to Scully, only half of the proposed expan-
sion sites would produce revenues comparable to the clubs located in the seven smallest ex-
isting Major League cities given such a winning percentage. Scully predicted that expansion
clubs in Denver, Miami, Phoenix, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Washington D.C. would be as
financially viable as existing small-market teams at such a winning percentage; expansion
clubs in Buffalo, Indianapolis, New Orleans, and Vancouver would have to play .500 baseball
to produce comparable revenues. Scully then concluded that, under the current regime, ex-
pansion into these sites would create financial instability to the detriment of Major League
Baseball. See Id. at 146-47.
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league, it seems that Major League owners should, at a minimum, pro-
tect existing Major Leagae franchises that are located in small markets.
Some owners, of course, may question the likelihood that a rival league
would ever arise to challenge the supremacy of Major League Baseball.
These owners, however, may be placing too much confidence in the ex-
emption from antitrust laws that Major League Baseball currently en-
joys.61 Most consider baseball's antitrust exemption to be a historical
anomaly,62 and many have recommended that it be lifted by Congress.63
Recently, legislators from Florida, in light of the owners' disapproval of
the sale of the San Francisco Giants to a Florida group intending to
move the team to Tampa-St. Petersburg, have considered proposing leg-
islation in Congress to have baseball's antitrust exemption removed.64
Should this occur, under the previously discussed free market model, the
creation of rival leagues should be encouraged to compete with the es-
tablished league for consumer dollars. Competition may ensue from
start-up leagues (both American and foreign), the entry of foreign
leagues (for example, Japanese or Mexican) into the American market,
or an upgrading in the level of play by existing minor league teams. It
appears, then, that the competitive position of Major League Baseball
vis-a-vis rival leagues is enhanced by the existence of franchises in small
markets.
As indicated, this justification generally does not comport with anti-
trust policy and the interest of society in promoting competition among
producers in a given industry. However, instead of focusing on its pur-
ported goal of preventing competition from rival leagues, owners could
argue that they are, in fact, enhancing consumer welfare by increasing
competition among teams within the league. Owners may further em-
phasize that their superior position in competing with potential rival
leagues in small markets is the result of an inherent advantage due to the
61. See infra Part III.
62. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at xiv. See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19,
at 100-122.
63. More than fifty bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to remove or weaken
Major League Baseball's exemption from antitrust laws. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 13.
Most recently, Bud Selig, Major League Baseball's acting commissioner and owner of the
Milwaukee Brewers, testified at a March 21, 1994, congressional hearing before, among
others, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio), a strong opponent of baseball's antitrust
exemption. Selig Spars with Senator at Hearing, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Mar. 22, 1994, at C2.
64. See supra Part III. In a suit brought by the aggrieved purchasers of the Giants, the
district court concluded that antitrust law was applicable to franchise relocation because Ma-
jor League Baseball's antitrust exemption "is limited to baseball's reserve system." Piazza v.
Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
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long history of Major League Baseball and its corresponding enhance-
ment of fan loyalty and interest. Whether these justifications pass anti-
trust scrutiny, however, likely depends on whether or not a court
believes that professional baseball is a "natural monopoly."65 Also, with
the essence of sports being competition designed to culminate in the
crowning of a single champion, the owners may argue that, as history has
shown, any rival league would ultimately be consumed by Major League
Baseball.66
III. THE VIABILITY OF SMALL-MARKET TEAMS UNDER MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL'S EXISTING REGIME
Once we conclude that small-market franchises are important to the
future of Major League Baseball, we must determine whether or not
such teams can survive under existing conditions. What are some of the
special obstacles facing small-market franchises? How do the current
rules governing Major League Baseball, as embodied by the Agree-
ment,67 address these challenges? What changes have occurred in the
environment in which Major League Baseball franchises operate which
threaten the viability of small-market teams, and what changes are likely
to occur in the future? These are some of the questions addressed in
Part III. We must first establish that the future viability of small-market
franchises is, in fact, threatened within the current governing structure of
Major League Baseball before considering measures that owners (or leg-
islators) should adopt to ensure the viability of such teams.68
A. Antitrust treatment of Major League Baseball:
Perhaps the best way to analyze the financial condition of small-mar-
ket franchises is to first discuss the broader context in which Major
League Baseball operates. This, in turn, will allow us to distinguish be-
tween those rules affecting small-market teams which are imposed by
agreement among the owners, and those imposed by society, either di-
rectly or indirectly, on Major League Baseball. Baseball owners, of
65. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 493 ("... the essence of sports is competi-
tion, the high point of athletic competition is the crowning of a champion, and the league
whose champion is generally recognized by fans as supreme inevitably receives the lion's share
of gate attendance and television revenues....").
66. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 13-43 (noting the failed attempts of the Federal Base-
ball League and Continental Baseball League to compete with Major League Baseball).
67. See supra note 19.
68. See infra Part IV.
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course, only have discretion to change the former.6 9 If it is determined
that the viability of small-market franchises is compromised under the
existing regime, distinguishing between rules in this manner will allow us
to identify those with the power to change relevant rules and enact
measures to protect the integrity of such teams.7 °
1. The historical development of Major League Baseball's antitrust
exemption:
The general power of owners to act is limited primarily by principles
of contract, tort, criminal, labor, and antitrust law.71 Of particular im-
portance for this discussion is the influence of antitrust law on the poli-
cies implemented by Major League Baseball.72 The applicability of § 2
of the Sherman Act to Major League Baseball was first raised in a case
brought against Hal Chase involving the legality of baseball's "reserve
clause."73 Although not vital to its holding, the Chase court noted that:
[It] cannot agree to the proposition that the business of baseball
for profit is interstate trade or commerce, and therefore subject to
the provisions of the Sherman Act... Baseball is an amusement, a
sport, a game that comes clearly within the civil and criminal law
of the state, and it is not a commodity or an article of merchan-
dise subject to the regulation of Congress on the theory that it is
interstate commerce.
74
That sentiment was echoed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a former
amateur baseball player,75 in a celebrated case brought in 1922 by the
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, a member of a new rival league,
against Major League Baseball for denying access to the players' market
through the reserve system.76 Holmes observed that:
[t]he business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely
state affairs... But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions
69. These "owner-controlled" restrictions govern teams' relationships with one another
and with the players. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 13. For the most part, I will be focusing
on the former restrictions, although we will also see how the latter restraints affect relation-
ships among teams.
70. See supra Part IV.
71. See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, chs. 2-7, 11.
72. For a summary of initial attempts to apply antitrust laws to the policies of Major
League Baseball, see ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 8-10; SCULLY, supra note 15, at 5-7.
73. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (1914). For a
detailed discussion of Major League Baseball's reserve system and its treatment under anti-
trust policy, see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 100-109.
74. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. at 16-17.
75. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 10.
76. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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the Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and
must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change
the character of the business ... [T]he transport is a mere inci-
dent, not the essential thing. That to which it is incident, the exhi-
bition, although made for money, would not be called trade or
commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is
put by the defendant, personal effort, not related to production, is
not a subject of commerce. That which in its consummation is not
commerce does not become commerce among the States because
the transportation that we have mentioned takes place. To repeat
the illustrations given by the Court below, a firm of lawyers send-
ing out a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua lecture bu-
reau sending out a member to argue a case, does not engage in
such commerce because the lawyer or lecturer goes to another
State... If we are right the plaintiff's business is to be described
in the same way and [this case does not involve] an interference
with commerce among the States.77
Thus, Major League Baseball was held to be exempt from coverage
under the Sherman Act.
With subsequent changes in the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause,78 it was clear to
many observers that baseball's antitrust exemption would soon be over-
ruled.79 Baseball's owners (and lawyers), anticipating a judicial response
to Congress' failure to grant a statutory antitrust exemption, prepared
themselves for the worst.8 0 The Supreme Court, however, threw owners
another curve when, in 1953, it held that it was up to Congress, and not
77. Id. at 208-09.
78. See e.g., Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(holding that Congress may regulate activity which has a "substantial economic effect" upon
interstate commerce); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (ex-
plaining that Congress may regulate activity when there is a "rational basis" for its finding that
the activity affects interstate commerce).
79. In one case, a former Major League player who had jumped to the Mexican League in
1946 found himself blacklisted by a policy adopted by Commissioner Chandler, and sued for
damages and reinstatement. In overruling the district court, the Second Circuit ruled that
baseball's involvement in radio and television had clearly involved baseball in interstate com-
merce and, as a result, subjected it to Sherman Act coverage. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d
402 (2d Cir. 1949). See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 13. In 1951, the House of Representatives
conducted hearings to determ;-e whether baseball's antitrust exemption should be legisla-
tively enacted. When the "Cealar Hearings" concluded without adopting any legislation, it
was clear to observers that the Committee had, in fact, determined that Gardella had super-
seded Federal Baseball and, by not adopting contrary legislation, had intended that baseball be
subject to the Sherman Act. See id. at 13-14.
80. Id. at 15.
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the courts, to remove baseball's antitrust exemption.,' Specifically, the
Court noted that:
Congress has had the [Federal Baseball] ruling under considera-
tion but has not seen fit to bring such business under [antitrust]
laws by legislation having prospective effect. The business has
thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding
that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation ... We think
that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application
to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation. Without re-
examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below are af-
firmed on the authority of [Federal Baseball] so far as that deci-
sion determines that Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws. 2
Congress and the Supreme Court, then, were both inclined to pass the
buck. "Congress did not enact legislation because it believed the [Gar-
della] decision removing baseball's antitrust exemption was good law,
not the [Federal Baseball] decision... [while] the Supreme Court puta-
tively did not reverse the precedent of the Holmes decision because it
interpreted congressional inaction in [the 1951 Cellar Hearings] as an
endorsement of [Federal Baseball].''8 3
In 1972, the Supreme Court revisited the issue and again upheld the
validity of baseball's antitrust exemption.8 4 In Flood, the Court noted
that:
the slate with respect to baseball is not clean. Indeed, it has not
been clean for half a century... We continue to loath, 50 years
after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to
overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive in-
action, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far
beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a de-
sire not to disapprove them legislatively... If there is any incon-
sistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of
long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by
this Court... Under these circumstances, there is merit in consis-
tency even though some might claim that beneath that consis-
tency is a layer of inconsistency.8 5
81. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
82. Id. at 357.
83. ZI MBALIST, supra note 1, at 15.
84. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
85. Id. at 283-84.
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As a result, Major League Baseball continues to enjoy a unique exemp-
tion from antitrust legislation, based on an erroneous assumption made
by the Supreme Court in 1922, not applicable to any other professional
sports league. 6 As previously indicated, however, this exemption has
come under increasing attack, and its continued viability is very much at
issue.87
2. The antitrust exemption and labor law in Major League Baseball:
Not surprisingly, Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption has
had a significant impact on the development of its policies towards play-
ers and among teams. Because of Federal Baseball and its progeny,
baseball's player reserve system, including the rookie draft and veteran
free agency, are exempt from the antitrust laws applicable to other pro-
fessional sports leagues.88
Presumably, this protection would shelter Major League Baseball
from antitrust scrutiny should it adopt a salary cap, 9 revenue sharing, or
any other measure typically thought of as "non-competitive" in nature.
At this point, however, it is again important to distinguish between
owner-adopted measures affecting the teams' relations with one another,
and those affecting the relationship between players and the League.90
Though many owner-adopted rules may be properly categorized under
86. "Baseball's exemption from antitrust statutes, based on the notion that it was not
involved in interstate commerce, erroneous back in 1922 and more so in the 1950s, became
even more anomalous in 1957, when the Supreme Court declared football to be subject to
antitrust statutes and stated that baseball's antitrust exemption was 'unreasonable, illogical
and inconsistent.'" ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 15 (citing, in part, LEE LOWENFISH AND TONY
LUPIEN, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: THE STORY OF BASEBALL'S RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE
MEN WHO FOUOHT TO CHANGE IT 187 (1980)).
87. See supra notes 63, 64.
88. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that the
National Football League's draft as it existed in 1968 constituted an unreasonable restraint of
trade and therefore violated § 1 of the Sherman Act); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the National Football League's "Rozelle Rule" requiring
a team that signed a veteran free agent to provide "fair and equitable" compensation to the
player's former team violated § 1 of the Sherman Act). Veteran free agency did, however,
arrive to Major League Baseball in 1975 through collective bargaining with the Andy Messer-
smith and Dave McNally grievances. See Nat'l & Am. League Professional Baseball Clubs
and Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 66 Labor Arbitration 101 (1975). For a detailed
discussion of these cases and -the issues they pose regarding the application of antitrust policy
to professional sports, see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 127-164.
89. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2903 (D.D.C. Mar. 10,
1992) (holding that the National Football League's salary cap for players on each team's de-
velopmental squad violated § 1 of the Sherman Act). See also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra
note 19, at 201-05.
90. See supra note 69.
[Vol. 4:323
FAIR OR FOUL?
either category, owners are, of course, constrained in adopting the latter
types of measures by agreement with the Major League Baseball Play-
ers' Association. 91 The Supreme Court has held that collective agree-
ments whose terms are principally felt by the immediate parties, and not
outside competitors, are immune from antitrust scrutiny. 92 This "labor
exemption" from antitrust scrutiny applies to any professional sports
league where owner/player relations are governed by a collective bar-
gaining agreement.93 Since every major professional sports league in the
United States is currently governed by such an agreement, and therefore
exempt from antitrust law, the Major League Baseball's historical ex-
emption may seem devalued. However, given this "special exemption,"
Major League Baseball players, unlike athletes in other professional
leagues, are unable to seek antitrust protection by decertifying their
union should they become dissatisfied with their gains in collective bar-
gaining.94 Major League Baseball's historical antitrust exemption, then,
continues to define the contours of negotiations between the owners and
the players' union by limiting an otherwise important option available to
the players. As a result, it has great value to baseball owners, who cur-
rently have significantly more leeway than their brethren in other sports
leagues in their power to adopt market restrictions affecting team rela-
91. In general, proper union activity, such as strikes, also enjoy an exemption from anti-
trust laws. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (finding that Clayton Act
protects labor disputes from substantive antitrust liability). Similarly, collective agreements
whose terms are principally felt by the immediate parties (and not outside competitors) are
immune from antitrust scrutiny. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965). As a result, collective agreements in the sports context also receive the labor exemp-
tion from antitrust. See e.g. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)
(finding that although labor exemption from antitrust is available to terms of collective agree-
ment, "Rozelle Rule" was found not to be exempt from the coverage of antitrust laws since it
was not the "product of bona-fide arm's-length negotiations"). For an illuminating discussion
of the labor exemption and its role in professional sports, see WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note
19, at 164-205.
92. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
93. See note 91 (referencing Mackey).
94. The National Football League Players' Association, for example, "declared itself no
longer a union representing players in collective bargaining and instigated another antitrust
suit against the NFL's player restraints" after a court ruled that the labor exemption prohib-
ited judicial review of a provision of the collective agreement where the parties had not yet
bargained to an impasse. Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989); but see
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1991 Trade Cases (CCH) 69, 454 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that the
labor exemption ends at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, not "at some
indeterminable point beyond expiration which is labelled 'impasse' "). This move by the
NFLPA prompted an antitrust suit brought by a player, Freeman McNeil, against the NFL
regarding the League's free agency policy, precipitating the arrival of free agency to the
League. See McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D.Minn. 1992). See generally
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 188-205.
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tions, such as franchise relocations, and their bargaining position in labor
negotiations.95
B. The current state of small-market teams in Major League Baseball:
So what effect (if any) has the antitrust exemption for Major League
Baseball had on the profitability of small-market franchises? How have
the rules adopted by Major League Baseball owners (after negotiating
with the players' union) affected the competitive position and viability of
small-market teams? Can small-market franchises survive in the future
under Major League Baseball's current governing structure? In answer-
ing these questions, we must begin by comparing the current financial
position of small-market teams with that of franchises with greater re-
sources. Should we uncover significant disparities in financial health, we
can then investigate whether they result from the policies enforced by
Major League Baseball. Furthermore, should we conclude that the fu-
ture viability of small-market franchises is at risk, we can propose meas-
ures that may be taken by owners to ensure the economic survival of
such teams in the future.96
1. Franchise values in Major League Baseball:
Major League Baseball owners profit from their franchises through
appreciation in market value and the generation of income. Clearly, es-
timating the value of any business is an inexact science; this is especially
true in Major League Baseball, where the profitability of a given
franchise is often difficult to ascertain.97 In general, the value of a
franchise should "approximate the discounted value of future estimated
profits, where profits are conceived broadly to include all forms of re-
turn."9 Average franchise values in the 1980s were nearly seventy times
greater than they were in the 1910s, and one small-market team, the Se-
attle Mariners, which was purchased for $13 million in 1981, was sold for
$77 million in 1988.99 Franchise values in all sports, in fact, grew at an
annual rate of 20% per year during the latter portion of the 1980s.10
With such a tremendous appreciation in value of baseball franchises over
the last decade, it seems that owners have found it profitable to operate
95. See supra notes 63, 64.
96. See infra Part IV.
97. See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 61-73.
98. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 62.
99. Id. at 67-68.
100. Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51.
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teams in small markets even if they experienced annual losses on their
financial statements.' 0'
These trends, however, are not likely to continue in the future. Ac-
cording to one source, the average franchise value in the Major Leagues
decreased by 4.2% from 1990 to 1991, and the average value of five of
the seven "small-market franchises"" 2 declined over the same period. 0 3
In 1992, the average franchise value in the Major Leagues further de-
creased by 16.24%. The average value of six of the seven "small-market
franchises," however, increased slightly due to "baseball's determination
to redistribute local TV revenues.""° Nevertheless, the overall decline
in franchise values may be attributed to two sources: player costs con-
tinue to rise faster than revenues (causing operating income to decline),
and owners are faced with a potential cut in national television broad-
casting revenues of 20%.10 As we shall later see, both factors will likely
continue to negatively affect franchise values in the future, and also have
a significant effect on the operating profits of Major League franchises.
At this point, it is sufficient to note that any decline in the rate of in-
crease of franchise values makes owners more reliant on operating in-
come for profits, just as a decline in the rate of appreciation of a stock
would make an investor more reliant on dividend payments in order to
recognize investment profits. This effect is compounded when the value
of Major League franchises decreases, as it did from 1990 through 1992.
2. Operating profits in Major League Baseball:
As noted above, the second part of the owners' "profit equation"
involves profits recognized from operations; this is what most people
have in mind when referring to the profitability of baseball franchises.
Again, one should keep in mind that it is extremely difficult to accurately
101. A major reason that franchise values increased rapidly during the 1980s was the abil-
ity of the League to control player salaries in the market for free agents through collusive
practices under former Commissioner Peter Ueberroth. For a summary of what happened, see
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 277-288.
102. See supra note 17.
103. Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51. Among small-market franchises, only
Cleveland and Seattle experienced a gain in franchise value over the preceding year; however,
Cleveland's gain was only $2 million and Seattle's gain of $8 million can, for the most part, be
attributed to the sale of the franchise to a group of investors in 1991.
104. See Michael K. Ozanian & Stephen Taub, Foul Ball, FINANCIAL WORLD, May 25,
1993, at 20.
105. Michael K. Ozanian & Stephen Taub, Big Leagues, Bad Business, FINANCIAL
WORLD, July 7, 1992, at 35-38. After the 1994 season, each club should expect a drop in
national broadcasting fees from over $15 million a year to around $9 million. See Ozanian &
Taub, supra note 104, at 20.
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measure the actual profits from operations of a franchise, especially
given the malleability of accounting principles, specialized tax treatment,
and specialized rules regarding the depreciation of player salaries. 10 6 By
carefully considering each of the elements affecting the team's income
statement and profitability, we can gain some insight into the status of
small-market clubs, vis-a-vis franchises operating in larger communities.
Operating profits equal revenues less operating expenses; from this fig-
ure, owners subtract depreciation from players' salaries, taxes, and inter-
est to arrive at net income. 10 7 It is within this framework that we can
ascertain relevant distinctions between small-market and large-market
teams in order to better determine whether small-market clubs will re-
main profitable in the future.
In general, reported operating profits in Major League Baseball in-
creased throughout the 1980s, from a $66.6 million loss in 1983, to a gain
of $214.5 million in 1989. This figure, however, subsequently declined to
approximately $142.9 million in 1990, $138.6 million in 1991, and $87.8
million in 1992.108 Thus, according to industry figures, baseball first be-
came profitable during the tenure of former Commissioner Peter Ueber-
roth, due in large part to the collusive practices of owners in the salary
offers made to veteran free agents.' 0 9 The decline in reported profits
during the 1990s resulted from the end of collusive practices among the
owners, which precipitated higher player salaries and coriipensatory pay-
ments which the owners were required to make to the players under the
settlement agreement." 0
106. Paul Beeston, former vice president of business operations for the Toronto Blue Jays,
noted that "[a]nyone who quotes profits of a baseball club is missing the point. Under gener-
ally accepted accounting principles, I can turn a $4 million profit into a $2 million loss, and I
can get every national accounting firm to agree with me." The "Beeston principle" was in full
swing from the years 1975-79, when, despite reported book losses in every year, Major League
Baseball had "substantial and growing operating profits." ZImALISr, supra note 1, at 62-63.
Much of the discrepancy is due to the depreciation of player salaries by owners, discussed later
in Part III. Owners have also been known to participate in "accounting chicanery" in order to
affect the bottom line. For example, the Turner Broadcasting System, which is ow.aned by Ted
Turner and owns the Atlanta Braves, paid the club $1 million in 1984 for television broadcast-
ing rights, well below the league average of $2.7 million that year. Given the Braves' large
geographic following, national exposure, and the number of games broadcast, the Braves
made a bad deal. However, while the Braves lost money, Ted Turner received tax benefits
from the transaction. For a detailed analysis of the Turner deal and other examples of the
accounting games that baseball owners play, see ZIMBALiST, supra note 1, at 64-67.
107. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 105, at 44.
108. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 64; Ozanian & Taub, supra notes 104, at 20; Ozanian
& Taub, supra note 105, at 34-35.
109. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 64; supra note 101.
110. Id. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 64; supra note 101.
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For our purposes it is significant to note how Major League Base-
ball's operating profits are distributed among franchises to analyze the
disparity between small-market and large-market teams. In 1990, for ex-
ample, five Major League teams recognized operating losses, including
three small-market franchises: the Kansas City Royals ($9.8 million),
Cleveland Indians ($6.8 million), and Seattle Mariners ($3.1 million)."'
Of the remaining twenty-one teams, the most profitable were the New
York Yankees ($24.5 million), New York Mets ($15.8 million), Toronto
Blue Jays ($13.9 million), Oakland Athletics ($12.4 million), Boston Red
Sox ($12.3 million), Philadelphia Phillies ($11.1 million), and Cincinnati
Reds ($11.0 million)." 2 In 1991, on the other hand, twelve clubs re-
ported operating losses, including five small-market teams: the Milwau-
kee Brewers ($11.4 million), Kansas City Royals ($7.2 million),
Cleveland Indians ($4.8 million), San Francisco Giants ($4.4 million),
and Oakland Athletics ($1.7 million)." 3 The most profitable teams in
1991 were the New York Yankees ($30.4 million), Toronto Blue Jays
($26.3 million), New York Mets ($20.7 million), Chicago White Sox
($18.0 million), Houston Astros ($14.5 million), Texas Rangers ($13.9
million), St. Louis Cardinals ($12.7 million), Baltimore Orioles ($11.1
million), and Boston Red Sox ($10.7 million)." 4 Finally, in 1992, thir-
teen clubs reported operating losses, including six small-market clubs:
the Milwaukee Brewers ($12.8 million), Oakland A's ($12.8 million),
Cincinnati Reds ($11.8 million), San Francisco Giants ($11.1 million),
Kansas City Royals ($5.1 million), and Seattle Mariners ($2.4 million)." 5
The most profitable clubs that year were the Baltimore Orioles ($34.2
million), New York Yankees ($25.0 million), Chicago White Sox ($16.7
million), Texas Rangers ($14.8 million), and Los Angeles Dodgers ($14.7
111. See Michael K. Ozanian & Stephen Taub, Secrets of the Front Office, FINANCIAL
WORLD, July 9, 1991, at 42-43. Commissioner Fay Vincent, on the other hand, claimed that
ten teams actually lost money in 1990. See ZIMBALTST, supra note 1, at 69.
112. Id. Note that in 1990, the small-market teams listed, the Oakland Athletics and Cin-
cinnati Reds, each won their division and advanced to the World Series where the Reds de-
feated the A's, four games to none.
113. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51. The other teams reporting operating
losses included the California Angels ($7.6 million), Montreal Expos ($4.2 million), Minnesota
Twins ($4.1 million), Pittsburgh Pirates ($4.0 million), Detroit Tigers ($2.8 million), Atlanta
Braves ($0.5 million), and the San Diego Padres ($0.4 million); of the small-market teams
recognizing operating profits, the Seattle Mariners netted $2.9 million, while the Cincinnati
Reds netted $0.2 million. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28.
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million).,16 While not necessarily an accurate measure of the actual
profits accruing to baseball owners," 7 these figures do suggest both a
wide discrepancy between the profitability of small-market and large-
market teams and a growing trend where small-market teams are finding
it more and more difficult to recognize operating profits at all within the
current economic environment of Major League Baseball." 8
Before investigating possible sources of this discrepancy, one impor-
tant factor affecting the actual profits recognized by the owners needs to
be discussed: the unique tax treatment given to the depreciation of
player salaries.119 In purchasing a team, an owner acquires three sets of
assets: player contracts (constituting a club's major asset), a franchise
right, and a set of contracts necessary for operations (for example,
leases, concession agreements, and broadcast agreements). 20 Under the
Internal Revenue Code, owners may treat player contracts as deprecia-
ble intangible assets.' 2 ' As a result, player contracts are depreciated
over the average length of a player's career.122 This, in effect, forces the
government to subsidize the purchase of the franchise by an amount
equal to the present value of the amount allocated to players' contracts
116. Id.; The only small-market franchise in this category, the Cleveland Indians, realized
$13.6 million in operating profits due to its inordinately low player costs, which approached
one-fourth that of most other teams. The Cleveland management has professed its commit-
ment to fielding young players whom they sign to low-cost, long-term contracts.
117. See supra note 106.
118. Zimbalist claims that the losses recently suffered by at least three small-market
franchises (the Pittsburgh Pirates, Seattle Mariners, and Kansas City Royals) may be due
more to "accounting gimmickry" and owner-based preferences than true cost overruns. Nev-
ertheless, while some teams that experience real operating losses may be able to turn profits
the following year through shrewd management, "ominous signs are on the horizon... Most
troubling.., is the projected drop in national media revenues." ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at
69-73.
119. See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 34-36; SCULLY, supra note 15, at 130-32
(indicating that no other industry is permitted to depreciate employee contracts).
120. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 130.
121. Id.; see 26 U.S.C. § 167(a) (1992).
122. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 130. Note that "[tihe percentage of the purchase price
of a franchise that may be allocated to player contracts and the estimated useful life of the
players are subject to negotiation with the IRS. Until the mid-1970s, generally 90% of the
franchise purchase price was allocated to player contracts in baseball and the useful life was
set at seven years." Id.; see, e.g., Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 1984)(ap-
proving district court ruling that it was proper for Bud Selig, when purchasing the Seattle Pilot
franchise in order to move it to Milwaukee in 1970, to allocate $10.2 million of the $10.8
million purchase price to player contracts). Under Section 212 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
however, a rebuttable presumption exists that no more than 50% of the purchase price of a
sports franchise should be allocated to player contracts. 26 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1992); see also
Selig, 740 F.2d at 579, n. 17 (finding that Section 212 did not apply retroactively to the Selig
purchase).
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multiplied by the corporate tax rate.12 However, as observed by one
author:
[f]rom an economic point of view, the loophole makes little sense.
First, it is obvious that the overwhelming share of the value of a
franchise belongs to the monopoly rent that is generated by be-
longing to Major League Baseball and the exclusive territorial
rights membership confers, not to the players' contracts. The
value of these rights does not depreciate over time. Second, base-
ball players do not depreciate as does a machine. In fact, most
players reach their peak performances well after the midpoint of
their careers. That is, for five years or more players appreciate in
value from their on-the-job training before they begin to depreci-
ate. Third, baseball players do not produce a net income stream
unless the additional revenue they generate for a team (their mar-
ginal revenue product) is greater than their salary. In this sense, a
ballplayer should be considered a depreciable asset no more than
a factory production worker. Fourth, players can be replaced sim-
ply by promoting a player from the minors. If anything, the de-
preciable investment in players should be the amount spent on
player development in the minor leagues, but this sum is ex-
pensed (the related expenses are fully deducted in each year) so it
cannot also be amortized. 24
The practice of amortizing player contracts, then, seems nothing more
than "a taxpayer subsidy to franchise owners and consumers of
sports."'" Not surprisingly, the depreciation of players' contracts, first
utilized in 1959 by owner Bill Veeck, has been called "his most important
contribution to the baseball business.' ' 26
How should the depreciation of players' contracts factor into our
analysis of the special problems facing owners of small-market clubs?
123. To recognize this tax shelter, an owner must have operating profits from the
franchise or other holdings equal to or greater than the amount of depreciation taken for
players' salaries. See Jennifer Reingold, When Less is More, FINANCIAL WORLD, May 23,
1993, at 38. The shelter was greater, of course, when the top corporate tax rate was higher (for
example, 46% until 1987) and before the IRS capped the maximum amount allocable to play-
ers' salaries at 50%. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 34-35; WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (1991); 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (1992). For an example of how this
tax shelter worked for Bud Selig and initial investors of the Milwaukee Brewers, see Murphy,
Trade Secrets, supra note 1, at 21.
124. ZI MBALIST, supra note 1, at 35-36.
125. SCULLY, supra note 15, at 132.
126. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 34. Commenting on the fairness of this special tax shel-
ter for owners, Veeck smugly replied: "Look, we play the 'Star-Spangled Banner' before every
game. You want us to pay income taxes too?" Id. at 35; See also SCULLY, supra note 15, at
130.
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First of all, just as they have considered removing baseball's antitrust
exemption in response to increasing dissatisfaction with the way Major
League Baseball is run, Congress may also consider eliminating this
unique tax treatment given to the owners of professional sports
franchises. 12 7 Secondly, the size of the tax shelter owners receive due to
the depreciation of players' contracts, because it depends on the
purchase price of a franchise, will be greater for large-market teams than
for small-market teams. Thirdly, we should also remember that, because
owners may only depreciate the value allocated to players' contracts
upon purchasing the franchise, its value to owners "diminishe[s] to zero
after the players' [contracts are] fully depreciated [typically, over five
years].' 12s Thus, the tax savings realized by owners due to the deprecia-
tion of players' contracts is, in fact, short-lived. 29 Finally, this sheltering
effect underlines the importance of basing financial analysis of franchises
on book profits rather than operating profits as a team can clearly "suf-
fer book losses but have positive cash flows. )130
3. Elements contributing to the decline in profitability of small-
market franchises:
So what has caused the recent decline in the profitability of small-
market franchises? Should we expect this downward trend to continue
in the future? Perhaps the best way to answer such questions is to look
at the elements underlying "operating profits" to uncover sources of di-
vergence between small-market and large-market teams. As noted ear-
lier, operating profits equals the difference between operating revenues
and operating expenses. Revenues in Major League Baseball are pri-
marily derived from three sources: broadcasting revenues, gate and sta-
dium revenues, and licensing revenues.' 3 ' Costs, in turn, are mainly
attributable to team costs (primarily player salaries), player develop-
ment costs, game costs (primarily stadium operations), promotional ex-
127. See supra notes 63, 64.
128. ZIMBALST, supra note 1, at 35.
129. Note, however, that the tax shelter also has a long-term benefit for owners because
in theory, it increases the value of each franchise by the present value of the expected tax
savings. In addition, while the tax shelter should induce rapid turnover of club ownership as
its short-term benefits to owners are fully realized, restrictions on franchise sale imposed
under the Major League Agreement deter prospective investors from purchasing a team
solely to recognize these gains. See Id.
130. SCULLY supra note 15, at 132.
131. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 48; SCULLY, supra note 15, at 117.
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penses, and general and administrative expenses. 32 Each will be
discussed in turn.
a. Broadcasting Revenues:
Broadcasting revenues currently account for approximately 50% of
the total revenues in Major League Baseball. 33 Each team receives
such revenues from both local and national sources. 134 Small-market
franchises, however, derive a much greater percentage of broadcasting
revenues from national sources.135 This is because national broadcasting
revenues are divided equally among the franchises, while local broad-
casting revenues are not.136 As a result, not only do small-market
franchises receive significantly less in broadcasting revenues than large-
market teams, but they are also much more dependent on national
sources. In 1992, for example, the teams receiving the most total media
revenues were the New York Yankees ($61 million), New York Mets
($50 million), Boston Red Sox ($40.1 million), Los Angeles Dodgers
($33 million), Detroit Tigers ($28.8 million), California Angels ($28.2
million), Toronto Blue Jays ($28 million), and Chicago Cubs ($28 mil-
lion).'37 The teams receiving the least in total media revenues, on the
other hand, were the Atlanta Braves ($17.3 million), Milwaukee Brewers
($19.8 million), Minnesota Twins ($20 million), Kansas City Royals ($21
million), Seattle Mariners ($22 million), and Cleveland Indians ($23 mil-
lion). 38 The disparity in broadcasting revenues becomes even greater
when we exclude the approximately $15 million each club received
under the national television contract in 1992.'1 9 The New York
Yankees, for example, realized over $40 million more in local broadcast-
ing revenue than the Milwaukee Brewers in 1992 ($46.0 million to $4.8
million), a ratio of almost 10 to 1.
132. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 123; ZIMBALISr, supra note 1, at 59-60.
133. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51; see also ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 48.
134. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 48.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28; see supra note 106 (teams such as the
Atlanta Braves and Chicago Cubs, which share ownership with the local television network
covering their games, receive less in local media revenues than otherwise expected).
138. Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28. Note that, excluding the Atlanta Braves (see
supra note 106), four of the six teams listed qualify as "small-market teams;" the Oakland A's
derived $25 million in media revenues in 1992, while the San Francisco Giants saw $24.5 in
such revenues.
139. Id.
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This does not give the complete picture. The above figures include
an agreement between the clubs with superstation broadcasting agree-
ments (Atlanta Braves, Chicago Cubs, New York Mets, and New York
Yankees) and Major League Baseball to make compensatory payments
to a central fund to be distributed among the remaining teams."4 Fur-
thermore, they also include a "modest revenue sharing [agreement
among teams to share] 'net receipts' from pay television.' 41 As a result,
the actual disparity in local (and total) broadcasting revenues generated
by small-market and large-market teams is even greater than indicated
by the above figures. Finally, national television broadcasting revenues
will decrease significantly in the future. CBS agreed to pay Major
League Baseball $1.06 billion, which was divided equally among teams,
for the right to broadcast nationally sixteen weekend games during the
regular season, the All-Star game, the playoffs, and the World Series
each year from 1990 to 1993. ESPN made a similar agreement to broad-
cast 175 regular-season games for $100 million a year during those
years. 42 Both networks, however, lost a significant amount of money,143
and Major League Baseball is bracing for a 20-30% drop in its new na-
tional television contract which will have to be divided among twenty-
eight, rather than twenty-six, teams. 44 For reasons previously discussed,
this will have a much greater impact on small-market clubs than large-
market clubs. Coupled with the prospect of continued growth in local
broadcasting revenues, 45 we can expect the disparity in total broadcast-
ing revenues between the "haves" and the "have nots" to increase dra-
matically in the next several years.
b. Gate and Stadium Revenues:
As expected, small-market teams are also disadvantaged as com-
pared to the large-market teams regarding gate and stadium revenues.
In general, the percentage of total operating revenues in Major League
Baseball attributable to gate and stadium receipts has fallen from 74.3%
140. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 50.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 148, 158.
143. CBS claimed after-tax losses of $55 million in 1990 and estimated losses of $170
million over the term of the contract. Its profits were, no doubt, hurt by the fact that the
World Series over those years generally involved small-market teams and few games. ESPN
estimated that it lost at least $36 million in 1990 and $24 million after taxes in 1991. Id. at 159-
60.
144. See Id. at 160.; see Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 20.
145. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 161-65 (also noting that pay-per view will likely be a
primary source of increased local broadcasting revenues in the future).
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in 1975 to approximately 33% in 1992, due in most part to increases in
broadcasting revenues over that same period.'46 The absolute amount of
gate and stadium revenues has also grown dramatically over that same
period due to rising attendance, higher ticket prices, higher parking and
concessions prices, and luxury box revenues. 147 Gate receipts, of course,
are a function of attendance and ticket prices, which are both affected by
team quality. Not surprisingly, small-market teams fare worse, on aver-
age, than large-market teams on both counts.'4 Stadium receipts, on
the other hand, depend on many factors; including whether the team
owns or leases, the terms of the lease agreement, and the existence of
luxury box revenues. Typically, the small-market teams fare worse than
those in large-markets. In 1990, for example, the teams with the highest
revenues from gate and stadium receipts were the Toronto Blue Jays
($47.3 million), New York Mets ($40.6 million), Oakland Athletics
($34.5 million), Los Angeles Dodgers ($32.5 million), Boston Red Sox
($32.2 million), and Kansas City Royals ($32 million). 4 9 That same
year, the teams with the lowest revenues from gate and stadium receipts
were the Atlanta Braves ($11.2 million), Cleveland Indians ($12.5 mil-
lion), Montreal Expos ($13.1 million), Detroit Tigers ($13.5 million),
Houston Astros ($13.6 million), and Seattle Mariners ($14.8 million). 50
In 1991 the teams with the highest gate and stadium revenues were the
Toronto Blue Jays ($56.5 million), Chicago White Sox ($46.8 million),
Los Angeles Dodgers ($44.6 million), New York Mets ($38.9 million),
and Boston Red Sox ($38.8 million); the teams with the lowest amounts
were the Montreal Expos ($13.7 million), Cleveland Indians ($16.1 mil-
lion), Milwaukee Brewers ($17.2 million), Houston Astros ($18.6 mil-
lion), Atlanta Braves ($19.2 million), Seattle Mariners ($20.5 million),
and San Francisco Giants ($20.5 million).'-' Finally, the most profitable
teams in this area in 1992 were the Toronto Blue Jays ($54.3 million),
Baltimore Orioles ($52.1 million),' 52 Chicago White Sox ($46.3 million),
146. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28; ZIMBALISr, supra note 1, at 50-51.
147. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51; ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 50-51.
148. One author noted that, "holding ticket price and team quality constant, an extra one
million in population size is worth 180,000 fans or $1,135,800 in ticket revenues to a club."
SCuLLY, supra note 15, at 114.
149. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 111, at 42-43. Note that, in 1990, the Oakland Ath-
letics advanced to the World Series before losing to the Cincinnati Reds, four games to none.
The Kansas City Royals, on the other hand, have a free-spending owner. See ZIMBALIS-r,
supra note 1, at 72.
150. Ozanian & Taub, supra note 111, at 42-43; see supra note 106.
151. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51; see supra note 106.
152. 1992 marked the opening of Oriole Park at Camden Yards.
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Boston Red Sox ($45.6 million), and Los Angeles Dodgers ($44.8 mil-
lion); those with the lowest receipts were the Cleveland Indians ($13.0
million), Houston Astros ($15.3 million), Detroit Tigers ($17.8 million),
San Francisco Giants ($18.6 million), Montreal Expos ($18.9 million),
and Seattle Mariners ($19.5 million).153 Thus, assuming that owners set
ticket prices at a profit-maximizing level, 5 4 we should expect that the
approximately $30 million disparity in gate and stadium revenues be-
tween small and large-market clubs will continue in the future. Further-
more, because the above figures include the gate sharing policy in effect
in both the National and American Leagues, the absolute disparity be-
tween the gate revenues of small and large-market teams is actually
much higher.'55
c. Licensing Revenues:
The third primary source of operating revenues for teams, licensing
revenues, brought approximately $77 million to Major League Baseball
in 1990 and approximately $102 million in 1991.156 Divided equally
among teams, these funds do not contribute to the existing income dis-
parity among teams, and added roughly $2.7 million to each team in 1990
and $3.7 million in 1991."'1
d. Total Operating Revenues:
So what is the total disparity in operating revenues between small-
market and large-market franchises? In 1990, the teams with the highest
revenues were the New York Yankees ($98 million), New York Mets
($81.1 million), Toronto Blue Jays ($77.5 million), Boston Red Sox
($68.5 million), and the Los Angeles Dodgers ($64.4 million). The low-
est-revenue producing teams were the Seattle Mariners ($34 million),
Cleveland Indians ($34.8 million), Montreal Expos ($35.3 million), At-
lanta Braves ($35.4 million), Detroit Tigers ($38 million), and the Mil-
153. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28. The figures for other small market teams
were as follows: Milwaukee Brewers ($21.6 million), Kansas City Royals ($26.6 millibn), and
Oakland A's ($33.0 million).
154. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 113.
155. The National League splits gate revenues between the home and visiting teams at
approximately a 90 to 10 ratio (specifically, the home team must share 71 cents per admission;
22 cents to the league office and 49 cents to the visiting team); the American League uses an
80 to 20 split. Significantly, luxury box revenues and concession revenues are not included.
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 57.
156. ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 57-58.
157. Id.
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waukee Brewers ($38.4 million). 581 In 1991, the top revenue producing
teams were the New York Mets ($91.1 million), New York Yankees ($90
million), Toronto Blue Jays ($88.7 million), Boston Red Sox ($81.5 mil-
lion), Los Angeles Dodgers ($79.3 million), and Chicago White Sox ($78
million). The teams with the lowest operating revenues were the Mil-
waukee Brewers ($38.8 million), Montreal Expos ($39.4 million), At-
lanta Braves ($40.3 million), Cleveland Indians ($42 million), Minnesota
Twins ($44.1 million), and the Seattle Mariners ($44.7 million).' 5 9 Fi-
nally, the teams with the highest operating revenues in 1992 were the
New York Yankees ($94.6 million), Boston Red Sox ($90.6 million), To-
ronto Blue Jays ($87.7 million), New York Mets ($86.9 million), and Los
Angeles Dodgers ($84.2 million). Those with the lowest figures included
the Cleveland Indians ($39.9 million), Houston Astros ($43.3 million),
Milwaukee Brewers ($45.3 million), Seattle Mariners ($45.4 million),
Montreal Expos ($46.7 million), and the San Francisco Giants ($47 mil-
lion). 1 6 0 Large-market franchises bring in approximately twice the oper-
ating revenues of their small-market competitors, and as previously
noted, this gap will likely increase as Major League Baseball's new na-
tional television'contract becomes effective during the 1994 season.
e. Player Salaries and other Operating Expenses:
Despite vast disparities in operating revenues, every Major League
franchise faces similar operating costs since each club is in the same mar-
ket for players. 6' While operating expenses 62 for baseball franchises
also include costs for player development and training, stadium opera-
tions, sales and promotion, and general administrative expenses, the pri-
mary source of operating expenses in baseball is player salaries. 63 In
1992 player costs constituted 58 percent of Major League Baseball's
gross intake, and averaged just over $35 million per team. 64
There is a significant disparity in player salaries between small-mar-
ket and large-market teams. In 1990, for example, the highest paying
franchises were the Kansas City Royals ($23.6 million), Boston Red Sox
($22.7 million), San Francisco Giants ($22.5 million), Oakland Athletics
158. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 111, at 42-43.
159. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51.
160. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28.
161. See generally Ozanian & Taub, supra note 111, at 42.
162. As previously indicated, operating expenses does not include costs for depreciation,
amortization, taxes, and interest.
163. See generally SCULLY, supra note 15, at 123-26; ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 59-61.
164. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28.
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($22.3 million), New York Mets ($22.2 million), and the California An-
gels ($21.9 million); the lowest-paying teams were the Baltimore Orioles
($8.1 million), Seattle Mariners ($12.6 million), Texas Rangers ($12.7
million), Minnesota Twins ($14.2 million), Atlanta Braves ($14.2 mil-
lion), and the Philadelphia Phillies ($14.2 million). 165 In 1991, the teams,
with the highest player salaries were the Oakland Athletics ($39.2 mil-
lion), Los Angeles Dodgers ($36 million), Boston Red Sox ($35.4 mil-
lion), New York Mets ($35.2 million), and the California Angels ($34.2
million); those with the lowest figures were the Houston Astros ($12.1
million), Seattle Mariners ($17.4 million), Atlanta Braves ($20.4 mil-
lion), Philadelphia Phillies ($21.7 million), Cleveland Indians ($21.8 mil-
lion), and the Montreal Expos ($21.8 million). 66 In 1993, the top paying
teams were the Toronto Blue Jays ($59.3 million), Oakland Athletics
($53.2 million), New York Mets ($50.8 million), Boston Red Sox ($49.3
million), Los Angeles Dodgers ($46.3 million), and the New York
Yankees ($43.5 million); the "stingiest" were the Cleveland Indians
($10.1 million), Houston Astros ($11.4 million), Montreal Expos ($18.4
million), Baltimore Orioles ($27.4 million), Philadelphia Phillies ($27.9
million), St. Louis Cardinals ($28.9 million), and the Seattle Mariners
($29.0 million). 167 Not surprisingly, a handful of large-market teams,
with higher operating revenues, are able to appropriate more money to-
ward player salaries than their small-market brethren; strangely, how-
ever, the lowest paying teams seem to include an equal number of small-
market and large-market clubs. Nevertheless, the ability of large-market
clubs to, on average, designate for players' salaries nearly twice the
amount of small-market clubs is important in considering the viability of
the latter, given that, while operating revenues in Major League Baseball
increased by nearly 18% between 1990 and 1992, player salaries in-
creased over 103% during that same period. 68
165. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 111, at 42-43. The Oakland and San Francisco
franchises were, no doubt, paying for their success in 1989, where both teams advanced to the
World Series, while the owner of the Kansas City Royals, Ewing Kauffman, was "perceived by
some to be baseball's last big-spending sportsman owner... in baseball to massage his pas-
sions, not his profits." ZIMBALISr, supra note 1, at 72.
166. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 49, at 50-51. The significant jump in player salaries
from 1990 to 1991 is attributable to the big increase in national television broadcasting and the
end of collusive practices by baseball owners in veteran free agency. See supra note 101.
167. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28.
168. See Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104 at 28; Ozanian & Taub, supra note 105 at 34. A
major factor affecting the increase in players' salaries over this time was the demise of collu-
sive practices by the owners. See supra note 101.
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What impact does the ability of large-market franchises to pay more
in player salaries than small-market teams have on the viability of small-
market teams? Does this mean that small-market teams are at a com-
petitive disadvantage on the field? Because each Major League team is
in the same market for player talent, it stands to reason that small-mar-
ket teams lack the financial resources to attract the same number of
proven quality players as large-market clubs. With fewer funds to work
with, small-market clubs are generally less active in the market for vet-
eran free agents, have a harder time resigning their own veteran free
agents, and must rely more heavily on their minor league systems to sup-
ply Major-League caliber players. 69 Thus, it would seem that the ros-
ters of small-market teams should be dominated by younger, less
experienced, and lower-salaried players with, perhaps, a handful of
highly-paid stars. Moreover, we should expect this state of affairs to
worsen as the rate in growth of players' salaries continues to dwarf that
of operating revenues. Thus, if veteran players are generally more pro-
ductive than their inexperienced cohorts, large-market franchises should,
on average, field more competitive teams than those in small markets. 7 °
Yet, naturally, poor performance on the field results in still lower attend-
ance, gate, and stadium revenues. 7 '
There are several criticisms to this market analysis linking the level of
player salaries to success on the field. One is that either quality manage-
ment or an owner's willingness to lose money can compensate for the
financial disadvantages faced by small-market teams. 72 However, as
small-market teams clearly do not have a monopoly over quality man-
agement or philanthropic ownership, such factors cannot be relied upon
169. Apart from ability to pay, we would still expect large-market franchises to attract the
best players because such players would bring more additional people to the ballpark, enlarge
the local media contract by a greater amount, and attract more promotional income than they
would in a small market. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 101.
170. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 125 (concluding that, based on salary figures and team
performance from 1978-87, "clearly, average player pay and average club record are linked").
But see ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 96 (concluding that, from 1984-89, average team salary has
been related only tenuously to team performance, as it explained less than 10% of the vari-
ance in team win percentage and less than 12% of the variance in team standing). Note,
however, that the salary figures used by Zimbalist occurred during the height of owner collu-
sion in the veteran free agency market, which significantly decreased the disparity in player
salaries among teams, thereby undermining his conclusion.
171. See SCULLY, supra note 15, at 113 (noting that, based on the 1984 season, each addi-
tional game won by a team brought in an additional 21,511 fans or $135,730 in ticket revenues
based on average ticket price).
172. See, e.g., ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 69-72 (noting that Ewing Kauffman, the owner
of the Kansas City Royals, is "perceived by some to be baseball's last big-spending sportsman
owner," who "is in baseball to massage his passions, not his profits").
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to preserve the viability of such teams once we determine that their sur-
vival is important to Major League Baseball. Another critique observes
that, because veteran free-agency has proven to be an inefficient manner
of securing a player's services, large-market teams do not have a compet-
itive advantage over small-market clubs despite their wealth. Using a
model devised by economist Gerald Scully for determining the value of a
player's contribution to a team's winning percentage and team revenues
("marginal revenue product"), Andrew Zimbalist concluded that
franchise owners typically pay veteran players, especially free agents,
more than their marginal revenue product. 73 However, whether an
owner does this because he or she misjudges the player's actual value to
the team, wishes to prevent the player from being signed by another
club, wants to use a popular player to "lure" baseball fans to the
ballpark, or simply prefers winning over profits,174 the result is the same:
a player is added who contributes, in some small degree, to the team's
winning percentage.
In an environment where large-market teams have the financial re-
sources to attract the greatest number of quality free agents, small-mar-
ket clubs must again operate at a competitive disadvantage. Thus,
assuming that each franchise is equally skilled at developing its own
players, wealthier teams may seek incremental gains in winning percent-
age through the veteran free agent market; over time, this should hurt
the profitability of small-market teams. But why then, some critics ar-
gue, has competitive balance increased, rather than decreased, since the
institution of free agency in 1976?1'5 One answer, of course, is that com-
petitive bidding in free agency has made it harder for any successful
team to keep its nucleus of players. Again, however, players are gener-
ally lost to large-market clubs. Other potential explanations include the
effect of long-term contracts on player performance, the compression of
173. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 90-94 (also noting that the marginal revenue product
of a star player will be higher in a large market than a small market); see SCULLY, supra note
15, at 154-58.
174. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 93-94. See also Andrew Zimbalist, Salaries and Per-
formance: Beyond the Scully Model, DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER 107, 130-132 (Paul M. Som-
mers ed. 1992).
175. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 95-101 (noting that, since 1976, twelve different
teams have won the World Series, and sixteen different teams have qualified for the World
Series [those figures have since increased to thirteen and seventeen, respectively]; only three
teams have failed to win division titles; and team winning percentages have narrowed over
time).
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baseball talent, and (of course) poor judgment by owners in signing free
agents. 76
While it is not possible to quantify into a specific number of wins per
season the advantage enjoyed by large-market teams over their small-
market brethren in offering larger salaries, it is important to note that its
effects are likely to increase in the future. As previously noted, a decline
in national television broadcasting revenue will increase the discrepancy
between revenues of small-market and large-market teams. This, cou-
pled with the explosion in players' salaries realized through the end of
owners' collusion in the veteran free agency market, will increase the
discrepancy between small-market and large-market teams in the ability
to pay competitive salaries to attract and keep quality players. Because
they will, on average, be less competitive on the field than large-market
clubs, small-market teams will experience further declines in gate and
stadium revenues. Whether this cycle has already begun or will manifest
itself in the future is not clear, however, now is the time for Major
League Baseball leadership to take steps to prevent the demise, and ut-
ter collapse of, small-market franchises. As noted by Andy MacPhail,
vice president and general manager of the Minnesota Twins who has
long predicted that playing field inequality will emerge from the extreme
disparity in revenues among teams: "Up to this point, I can't back that
[prediction of imbalance] up, but do you have to have a nuclear bomb
dropped on you to want some sort of disarmament?' '1 77
IV. MEASURES THAT MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OWNERS MAY
ADOPT To ENSuRE THE VIABILITY OF SMALL-MARKET
TEAMS
What are the alternatives available to Major League Baseball owners
once they have determined that the viability of small-market franchises
is important and they have analyzed the precarious position of small-
market teams under the existing framework? Which alternative will be
most effective, and who will bear the costs? Finally, what are the legal
impediments facing owners in adopting each measure? These are the
questions addressed in the remainder of this Article. As reflected in
Part III, Major League owners may take one of three approaches in
dealing with the "small-market problem"; they may maintain the status
176. See id. at 96-97. Zimbalist also suggests that, what may initially appear to be "owner-
ship stupidity" in the signing of free agents, may actually be a conscious attempt to maintain
competitive balance with small-market teams to escape pressure to share revenues. Id.
177. Id. at 99.
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quo, reduce the revenue disparity among teams, or reduce the cost dis-
parity among teams. Each option will be discussed in turn.
A. Maintaining the status quo and community responses:
While acknowledging their common interest in ensuring the viability
of small-market franchises, Major League Baseball owners may con-
clude that, despite the above-referenced revenue and cost disparities,
such teams can survive in the existing governing structure. As a result,
owners may decide that the current rules governing Major League Base-
ball are adequate to ensure on-the-field and financial competition
among teams and that, therefore, the existing scheme requires no revi-
sion. If owners take this approach, what is likely to happen to small-
market teams in the future?
1. Likely future trends:
As previously noted, small-market teams will suffer an inordinate de-
cline in operating revenues under the new national television broadcast-
ing contract, increasing the disparity in total revenues between small-
market and large-market teams. This will permit large-market teams to
further exploit their advantage over small-market clubs in signing play-
ers with proven talent through veteran free agency, further increasing
the disparity in players' salaries. Over time, small-market teams will find
it harder to compete on-the-field, which will decrease gate and stadium
revenues and further contribute to the variance in wealth between small-
market and large-market franchises.
Some may argue that small-market clubs can remain competitive if
they learn to operate more "resourcefully" than other teams. Clearly,
any team with quality management or a free-spending owner should, on
average, outperform other teams lacking on either front. As previously
noted, however, there is no reason to expect that small-market teams
will necessarily usurp such advantages. Also recall that, while we deter-
mined that small-market teams will be more reliant on their farm sys-
tems to develop talented players than will large-market teams due to
their limited ability to enter the free agency market for proven talent,
they will similarly have fewer financial resources to devote to this impor-
tant player resource. One should expect that the small-market teams
will compensate for their financial disadvantages by making better deci-
sions than large-market clubs in player acquisition and development.
Moreover, because small-market franchises lack the financial resources
to enter the market for free agents to "shore-up" weak spots resulting
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from previous personnel decisions, any mistakes they make in player de-
velopment or player selection will be magnified.178
2. Luxury box revenues:
Small-market franchises will be forced to find some way to increase
operating revenues in order to remain competitive with large-market
clubs in the search for quality players. Because gate and stadium reve-
nues are linked to ticket prices and attendance, which are dependent on
team performance, they are an unlikely source of increased revenue.
Similarly, small-market teams will not be able to look to national or local
broadcasting revenues as an increasing source of funds. As a result,
many owners perceive that the revenues generated by luxury boxes is
the best way to reduce the revenue disparity among clubs. In general,
luxury boxes may add as much as $6 million a year to a team's revenues.
For some teams, this constitutes over forty percent of total gate re-
ceipts. 79 In addition, luxury box revenues need not be shared with
other teams.'8 0 With luxury boxes contributing so significantly to the
revenues of many teams, it is not surprising that many communities, in-
cluding Milwaukee, are faced with the choice of either using taxpayers'
money to build a new stadium with luxury boxes or losing their teams to
other cities willing to do so.' 8 '
Revenues from luxury boxes, however, are not a panacea. First of
all, as of 1991, all but two baseball stadiums already contained luxury
boxes. 82 For most teams, therefore, the incremental gain in revenues
from building a new stadium with luxury boxes are much smaller than
that of the Milwaukee Brewers. Secondly, there is often weak corporate
demand for luxury boxes in small-market communities. Plans for con-
structing a new stadium in Milwaukee, for example, were stalled when
the team had trouble pre-selling skyboxes to finance construction,8 3
while weak demand for luxury boxes at the Kingdome contributed to the
178. Milwaukee Brewers management, for example, claimed that costly free-agent acqui-
sitions and long-term signings of ineffective and injured players precluded them from re-
signing their best player, veteran Paul Molitor, in 1993; Molitor joined the World Series
champion Toronto Blue Jays through free agency. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 123, at 25.
179. See supra note 2; Ozanian & Taub, supra note 104, at 28. The amount of money
generated from luxury boxes, of course, depends a great deal on the obsolescence of the sta-
dium involved and the affluence of the surrounding community.
180. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 57.
181. See supra note 16; see Murphy, Trade Secrets, supra note 1, at 21.
182. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 1, at 55.
183. See Morris, supra note 2, at 48; Murphy, Trade Secrets, supra note 1, at 22.
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financial troubles of the Seattle Mariners."8 Thirdly, most teams are un-
willing, or, in the case of small-market clubs, unable, to construct a new
stadium without a subsidy from taxpayers, many of whom "have grown
weary of being held hostage by teams that threaten to move."'8 15 This
has not proven to be the case in Milwaukee, where state and local gov-
ernment have already agreed to provide $67 million and a $35 million
loan for the Brewers' proposed new stadium.186 Finally, proposals to in-
crease revenues from luxury boxes are probably best viewed as tempo-
rary solutions to long-term problems. We saw earlier that the disparity
in operating revenues between small-market and large-market teams is
likely to continue growing in the future, giving the latter an increasing
advantage in attracting quality players. While temporarily closing the
gap, luxury box revenues do not address the long-term trend of "richer
teams getting richer faster than the poorer teams," with its resulting dis-
parity in financial and on-the-field competitiveness.
B. Increased revenue sharing in Major League Baseball:
If reliance on luxury-box revenues to save small-market teams is mis-
guided, then what alternatives are available to ensure their future viabil-
ity? A second approach that Major League Baseball owners may take is
to reduce the income disparity through increased revenue sharing. As
previously noted, Major League Baseball currently divides licensing and
national broadcasting revenues equally, and divides gate revenues be-
tween home and visiting teams by a ratio of 80 to 20 in the American
League and 90 to 10 in the National League. 8 7 However, each team
keeps 100% of its local media revenues. We saw that the continued in-
crease in local broadcasting revenues is a primary source of income dis-
parity between small-market and large-market teams. Clearly then, the
existing level of revenue sharing is inadequate in dealing with the
problems confronting small-market clubs.
Major League Baseball could implement several measures to further
revenue sharing in decreasing the income disparity between small-mar-
184. See Anthony Baldo, Edifice Complex, FINANCIAL WORLD, Nov. 26, 1991, at 36.
185. Id. at 34 (noting that stadium referenda in San Francisco, Oakland and Miami have
failed in recent years, while civic groups have opposed new projects in Detroit and Chicago).
To get around taxpayer disapproval, some areas have created "sports authorities," which "pro-
vide public financial support to stadiums-without public consent" (for example, the Georgia
Dome in Atlanta and Oriole Park at Camden Yards in Baltimore). Id. at 35. See supra notes
1, 16.
186. See Murphy, Spring Fever supra note 1, at 82; Murphy, Trade Secrets supra note 1, at
21.
187. See supra note 155.
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ket and large-market teams. Owners could agree to divide gate receipts
more equally among teams, include luxury box revenues in the distribu-
tion of gate receipts, and/or share local broadcasting revenues.' 8 The
first two proposals, while reducing the current size of the income dispar-
ity among teams, does not address the increasing income gap between
small-market and large-market teams given the growing disparity in lo-
cal broadcasting revenues. As a result, the third option would appear to
be the optimal long-term solution to the problem of revenue disparity in
Major League Baseball. Owners must also determine the level at which
revenue disparity between small-market and large-market teams no
longer acts as an impediment to the on-the-field and financial competi-
tiveness of small-market teams. In theory, the equal division of all
sources of League revenues (with "cost-of-living adjustments" between
large and small markets) would provide the optimal level of financial
and on-the-field competitiveness within professional baseball. But
achieving this standard of "perfect competition" is clearly not necessary.
Even holding factors such as quality of management and ownership be-
nevolence constant, lower-revenue franchises can surely survive as long
as their competitive position reasonably approximates that of large-mar-
ket teams. Deciding how much of an operating revenue disparity is too
much, however, is a question best left to knowledgeable Major League
Baseball insiders. Nevertheless, "it seems inevitable that some addi-
tional revenue sharing will be necessary" in the future.18 9
1. Labor law issues in revenue sharing:
Revenue sharing in Major League Baseball presents several impor-
tant labor and antitrust law issues. Obviously, changes in the amount of
revenue shared among teams will affect the ability of each team to pay
players and therefore affect the dispersion of veteran and young players
throughout the league. Presumably, these are changes in the "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment" which must be
negotiated with the players' union through collective bargaining. 19°
188. In particular, "because the clubs can no longer rely on the reserve system to insulate
equality of team playing talent from inequality in team earnings, there is considerable interest
in league-wide revenue sharing in major league baseball - particulary sharing of local broad-
cast revenue." WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 438-39.
189. See ZIrvmALlSr, supra note 1, at 173. Recognizing this, the owners, after much de-
bate, unanimously agreed on a plan to share local broadcasting revenue on January 18, 1994;
that plan, conditioned on approval of a salary cap by the players' union, promises small-mar-
ket clubs between $5 and $9 million a year in additional revenue. See Bob Berghaus, Revenue
Plan a Victory for Selig to Savor, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 1994, at Al.
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1993).
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However, because revenue sharing would increase competition among
teams in bidding for the services of players, salaries should rise; as a
result, it should not be difficult for owners to negotiate desired changes
in existing revenue sharing provisions. Revenue sharing is best viewed,
then, as a method of redistributing profits among teams, rather than as a
measure to limit player salaries.
2. Antitrust law issues in revenue sharing:
Finally, one should consider the treatment of revenue sharing ar-
rangements under antitrust policy. We saw that, while Major League
Baseball currently has a special exemption from antitrust not given to
other professional sports leagues, this exemption is by no means "iron-
clad."'' Without this exemption, the players, if dissatisfied with their
gains under collective bargaining, could seek antitrust protection by
decertifying the players' union, thereby eradicating the labor exemption
from antitrust.192 As a result, it is important to consider the implications
of antitrust law on any agreement among owners to share revenues.
The Sherman Act makes unlawful "every contract, combination...
or conspiracy in restraint of trade" in interstate commerce, and also pro-
hibits monopolizing, attempts to monopolize, and combinations or con-
spiracies to monopolize any part of interstate commerce. 93 An initial
issue, is whether Major League Baseball "consist[s] of a group of inher-
ently economically competitive clubs who have come together to cooper-
ate in some aspects of otherwise autonomous businesses, [thereby
invoking § 1 of the Sherman Act], [or] a single integrated entity . . .
which is thus incapable of conspiracy in restraint of trade when it estab-
lishes its internal operating rules and structure, [thereby invoking § 2 of
the Sherman Act].' 9 4 Because antitrust challenges to revenue sharing
in Major League Baseball would likely originate from players (rather
than rival leagues), § 1, rather than § 2, of the Sherman Act seems appli-
cable.195 As a result, because revenue sharing does not involve per se
191. See supra Part III, notes 63, 64.
192. Id.
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1993).
194. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 353. At least one court held that the National
Football League was not a "single entity" for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act and, in fact,
constituted "separate economic entities engaged in a joint venture." North American Soccer
League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1254 (2d Cir. 1982).
195. See generally Gary R. Roberts, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, THE Busi-
NESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 135, 136-48 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds.
1991) (historically, interleague disputes have involved § 2 of the Sherman Act, while in-
[Vol. 4:323
FAIR OR FOUL?
price fixing or other unlawful activity,196 it would have to pass a "reason-
ableness" test administered by a reviewing court to survive antitrust
scrutiny.197
What are some factors that Major League Baseball owners could use
to convince a court that its revenue sharing arrangement is "reasonable"
for purposes of antitrust review? In general, courts focus on the impact
that the challenged restraint would have on competitive conditions, con-
sidering the structure of the industry, facts peculiar to a firm's operation
within an industry (including power and position), the history and dura-
tion of the restraint, and the reasons why it was adopted.' 98 With in-
creased revenue sharing, baseball owners would emphasize its effects on
the financial and on-the-field competitiveness of small-market teams.
Such measures, they would argue, are necessary to the success of their
"joint venture," and benefit consumers to the extent that they increase
on-the-field competition, limit franchise instability and relocation, and
bring financial stability (and, perhaps, lower ticket prices) to the League.
This especially holds true if baseball is regarded as a "natural monopoly"
resulting from fans' desire to crown one champion.199 Deflecting atten-
tion from the effects that revenue sharing may have in discouraging the
creation of rival leagues, this view emphasizes its perceived pro-competi-
tive effects on team performance and consumer welfare.2"
C. Adopting a Salary Cap in Major League Baseball:
A third approach that owners could take in ensuring the viability of
small-market teams is to reduce the widening discrepancy in player sala-
ries by adopting a salary cap. While revenue sharing "distributes the
total income pie" equally among owners, a salary cap is designed to
"redivide the portions of the pie" received by owners and players. Thus,
"the term 'cap' is actually something of a misnomer for this arrange-
ment... [which] really.., is an agreement between clubs and players
associations about what 'share' of league revenues is to be spent on
player salaries and other kinds of compensation." '' A salary cap, of
traleague disputes have involved § 1 of the Sherman Act); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19,
at 445-456.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150,212-18 (1939).
197. See generally Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
198. Id.
199. See supra note 65.
200. See supra Part II.
201. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 303.
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course, may be instituted in several ways; owners may set a maximum
amount that each team may pay in total player salaries, a maximum
amount that any team may pay a particular player, or some combination
(or derivation) of both measures. Again, it may not be necessary for
baseball owners to establish the same salary maximum for every
franchise in order to achieve competitive balance within the Major
Leagues. °2 However, if we hold management quality and owner benev-
olence constant among teams, then on-the-field competition should in-
crease as player costs are brought into uniformity.20 3 Nevertheless, as in
the case of revenue sharing, the optimal method of implementing a sal-
ary cap, and whether or not it should be uniform among teams, is best
left to the expertise of baseball insiders.
1. Labor law issues and the salary cap:
A salary cap and revenue sharing involve similar labor law issues. A
salary cap would obviously affect the "wages, hours, and conditions of
employment," thus qualifying as a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining between owners and the players' union.2 Intuitively, players
typically resist the notion of a salary cap given its restrictions in the mar-
ket for player talent and explicit goal of limiting the total share of reve-
nues meted out to players. However, a salary cap may also inflate player
salaries for teams below the cap, especially if the owners also incorpo-
rated a "salary floor. '20 5 Thus, the coupling of a salary minimum with a
salary maximum may increase the overall share of team revenues allo-
cated for player salaries.0 6 Because the salary maximum must be set no
higher than the amount that the least-wealthy teams can afford to pay,
the players' union is not likely to accept a salary cap without increased
revenue sharing among baseball owners.20 7 Baseball owners recently
202. Salaries may be adjusted, for example, based on the cost of living and promotional
income in different locales.
203. See id. As previously noted, players are also attracted to teams by the number of
endorsement opportunities available in a given location. As a result, if an unadjusted uniform
salary cap was applied to every team, the best players would generally migrate to large-market
teams. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 169.
204. See supra note 190.
205. The National Basketball Association, for example, has, in principle, both a team sal-
ary maximum and team salary minimum. Its principles are outlined in WEILER & ROBERTS,
supra note 19, at 300-304.
206. See id.
207. According to one observer, "[t]he union has always been ready to listen to proposals
on revenue sharing and a salary cap-one based on equal sacrifice, not just as a means of
saving owners money." Larry Whiteside, Baseball Owners in a Sharing Mood, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1993, at 39, 41.
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agreed on such a proposal, which they will present to the players' union
in their next round of collective bargaining.208 Its palatability to the
players, ultimately hinges on the percentage of revenues shared among
teams.
As previously indicated, full revenue sharing would presumably ad-
just player salaries to a market-clearing rate. A salary cap, while offering
little in terms of restoring fiscal equality to baseball, may nevertheless be
acceptable to the players if set at or near the market rate. As the level of
revenues shared diverges from this equilibrium point, however, the play-
ers are likely to become increasingly resistant to a salary cap which, is set
based on the least-wealthy teams' ability to pay. Under such circum-
stances, the players receive a lower share of total revenues, with the dif-
ference accruing to the wealthiest teams (who can no longer use such
funds to price other teams out of the free agent market). Moreover,
even with partial revenue sharing, a salary cap offers little in terms of
restoring fiscal and competitive equality, for teams, assuming that the
amount of revenue shared by the owners allows small-market teams to
reasonably bid with their brethren in the players' market. Under such
circumstances, the players would receive a "cut" of the above-referenced
excess revenues accruing to the wealthiest teams. If the amount of reve-
nues shared is inadequate to allow small-market teams to competitively
bid for players' services with their large-market brethren, a salary cap
becomes vital to restoring fiscal equality among teams. Under such cir-
cumstances, the players receive a yet lower share of total revenues, with
the difference again accruing to the wealthiest teams. Baseball owners,
then, can likely solve the "small-market problem" through significant
revenue sharing without the imposition of a salary cap on players. Their
current proposal, linking both measures, may result from, (1) an inade-
quate degree of revenue sharing (thus necessitating a salary cap for fiscal
competitiveness), (2) pressure by large-market owners reluctant to fur-
ther share revenues with players through free agency, (3) pressure by
small-market owners desiring equal competition in the bidding of play-
ers, and/or, (4) the owners' awareness of the pressure on the players'
union to pass such proposal for fear that they will be viewed by the pub-
lic as greedy, pampered athletes who killed the return of fiscal sanity to
the game. Ultimately, the union is likely to condition acceptance of the
owners' proposal on increased revenue sharing among teams.
208. See supra note 189.
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2. Antitrust law issues and the salary cap:
Finally, just as in the case of revenue sharing, owners should consider
whether justifications of a salary cap are "reasonable" under the laws of
antitrust.20 9 But while a salary cap, like revenue sharing, may increase
competition on-the-field and preserve the financial integrity of small-
market teams, some courts may determine that alternative measures are
available to owners that are less restrictive on market forces.2 10 A court
may decide, for example, that owners, through redistribution of revenues
generated from their "joint venture," rather than players, through salary
limitations, should bear the burden of ensuring the survival of small-
market teams. Owners, on the other hand, may argue that restrictions of
player costs, as pro-consumer measures, actually demand less scrutiny
under antitrust analysis because they bring lower ticket prices to baseball
fans. 11 Ultimately, of course, any decision by the players' union to
decertify for purposes of seeking antitrust protection would depend on
the likelihood that a reviewing court would find a salary cap to be a pro-
consumer measure, rather than a naked price-fix by owners, as well as
their negotiating position in collective bargaining.212 Nevertheless, it
seems clear that a court would more closely scrutinize an owner-adopted
measure directly impacting a labor market than such a measure involv-
ing a mere redistribution of League revenues.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1951, William Wrigley observed that baseball was a "very peculiar
business. '2 13  That observation, made over forty years ago, seems
equally applicable today. As we have seen, Major League Baseball has
experienced tremendous changes in its competitive environment in re-
cent years regarding the rate of increase of player salaries and various
sources of operating revenues. These trends have magnified the compet-
itive disadvantages of small-market franchises both on-the-field and on
the balance sheet. Many experts believe that recent growth in the rate of
increase of the revenue disparity between small-market and large-mar-
ket teams will accelerate in the future. Absent significant changes, the
209. See supra Part III; notes 63, 64, and 197.
210. See, e.g., Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239.
211. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984)
(finding no antitrust violation where the health insurer's practice of requiring all doctors who
performed patient services to accept its fee schedule because it held medical and insurance
costs down for consumers). See also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 127-131.
212. See supra Part III, notes 63, 64.
213. See MILLER, supra note 9, at 1.
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owners of small-market franchises can expect to operate in a still harsher
environment in the years to come. I have suggested two measures, in-
creased revenue sharing and a salary cap, that Major League Baseball
owners may take to preserve the integrity of small-market teams. The
former would be more palatable to the players' union and more likely to
withstand antitrust scrutiny by a reviewing court.
Whatever measures baseball owners ultimately adopt to protect
small-market teams, it is important that they act now. As the existing
policies of Major League Baseball become less and less responsive to the
problems confronting the game, an increasing number of people will be-
come disenchanted with baseball's current governing structure and seek
external review.214 We also saw that, not only could removal of Major
League Baseball's antitrust exemption subject owner-adopted market
restrictions to court review, but it may also adversely affect their ability
to negotiate desired changes with the players' union in collective bar-
gaining. Finally, we saw that absent action by the League to preserve
small-market franchises, community-based measures designed to help in-
crease team revenues, such as financing the construction of a new sta-
dium and luxury boxes, are inadequate to ensure the long-term survival
of such teams.
It may offer little solace to baseball fans in Milwaukee (and other
small markets) that their fears of losing their franchise are well-
grounded if the community cannot generate substantial public funding
for the construction of a new stadium with a convertible roof and luxury
boxes.215 Under Bud Selig's latest stadium proposal, this entails a $35
million loan, $67 million for infrastructure costs, and over $250 million in
tax exemptions and other costs over the stadium's thirty year mortgage.
The franchise, in turn, would recognize an estimated $9.6 million in an-
nual revenue.21 6 These same fans, however, would probably be quite
surprised to find out that this substantial community subsidy is not
enough to guarantee the survival of the Brewers franchise in Milwaukee.
Clubs competing in small and large markets will also take steps to maxi-
mize operating revenues through stadium construction and luxury box
rentals. This will minimize the ability of small-market teams to use lux-
ury box revenues as a method of decreasing the disparity in total operat-
ing revenues. With the increasing disparity in operating revenues
214. See supra notes 63, 64.
215. See supra note 1.
216. Id.; Daniel P. Handley Jr., Selig Intent on Another Big Victory, MILWAUKEE JOUR-
NAL, Feb. 27, 1994, at Al.
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between small-market and large-market teams, the initial boost in oper-
ating revenues created by a new stadium and luxury boxes represents a
short-term solution to a long-term problem. At best, the Milwaukee
community, by subsidizing the construction of a new stadium, is simply
taking a calculated risk to "buy time" until Major League Baseball own-
ers implement measures to ensure the financial integrity of small-market
teams. Owners have recently taken the first step by unanimously ap-
proving a revenue sharing agreement contingent on the players' union
acceptance of a salary cap.217 Approval is not guaranteed, however, and
the clock is still ticking; only time will tell if baseball owners have done
enough.
217. See supra note 189.
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